May 01, 2025

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-006882 - ANHAR, MICHAEL N vs CITY OF TURLOCK – Petitioner’s Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Ordinary Declaratory Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED. See below.

CV-24-010295 – ANHAR, MICHAEL N vs CITY OF TURLOCK – Petitioner’s Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Ordinary Declaratory Judgment - HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court has some questions, intends to proceed with oral argument, and take the matter under submission and will discuss next steps. 

Procedural Summary: 

Petitioner City of Turlock are well-known to each other. Petitioner has filed a series of Petitions against the City. 

Petitioner filed case CV-20-2330 on May 15, 2020, and the petition was denied on November 4, 2020. 

Anhar filed three more petitions in 2021 and 2022, CV-21-6226, CV-22-2853 and CV-22-4045. I began these cases with a preliminary stated view that the City had erred but would resolve the errors and the Court was unlikely to grant the petitions. 

Instead, after extensive litigation, the Court issued a 13-page statement of decision outlining the City's approach to Petitioner's claims, and finding them insufficient for the task. The City chose to treat Petitioner as a confused self-represented litigant whose arguments were time-wasting. This was unwise, as Mr. Anhar is an unusually detail-oriented and persistent self-represented litigant.

The Court ruled for Petitioner on those claims. 

This leads us to the new cases, CV-24-6882 (consolidated with CV-24-8008) and CV-24-10295 (which is the consolidated case also including CV-25-218 and CV-25-623.) These cases will be referenced by their final digits. 

Summary of new cases: 

The Court declines to consider prior statements made by the parties which appear aimed toward settlement. The Court does consider statements made as to what documents should or will be provided. 

Factual summary: In 6884, Anhar received a knock at his door by police at 6:40 p.m. on August 19, 2024. He immediately filed an electronic request for all records regarding the police inquiry. The City replied on August 29, 2024 that under Government Code sections 7932,600 through 7923.625 and section 7922.000 he would be provided with the media log and no further information. The media log indicates an officer responded to a report of a disturbance and the matter was closed by the officer. 

The case was filed on August 30, 2024. On September 18, 2024, the City sent a meet and confer letter to Anhar regarding a proposed demurrer. After a meet and confer, Anhar received a redacted CAD log which the parties (and I) believe were sufficient response. Anhar pursues this case only for declaratory judgment. 

The Opposition states that Anhar was informed of a disturbance call at 3162 Kendra Court in the letter and media log, but the letter says it was at 3183 Kendra Court (Anhar's address.) It appears the parties concede that the issue stemmed from Anhar allegedly walking on the property or in front of the property at 3162 Kendra Court, as reflected by the media log. 

In 8003, Anhar filed a revised request for documents concerning his September 1, 2024 call for service for two (allegedly) illegally parked cars in front of his residence. He filed that request on September 20, 2024. 

The City responded on September 27, 2024 asserting the request for "all written TPD records concerning," the call was insufficiently precise. The City provided an explanation of who went to the scene, what the investigation showed, and what the resolution was. The City refused to provide the CAD log. 

Anhar argues that the summary he received is not the same as having the derivative data from another source (such as the CAD log.) The Court will want a copy of the CAD log for its in camera review. 

Case 10295 has a different and primarily factual issue. Anhar sent his requests to city attorney Petrulakis, contract attorney Greg Palmer, and two others. This was not the normal course of operations, but Anhar asserts he was told to send these matters to Palmer "as a courtesy." The Court preliminarily rejects Anhar's assertion that he could send the requests to the attorney as a general rule and the attorney would be obliged to shepherd it through the system given that Turlock had (and it appears to) a pre-existing process known to Petitioner.

Simply cc’ing the PRA address would likely have solved the issue in part.

As Mr. Anhar accurately observes, the Court is without authority to issue orders to Mr. Anhar in this case. 

Even assuming an agreement to send documents to Mr. Palmer, such documents ought to have been sent to the City's PRA address for handling. 

There are no outstanding documents in this case. 

Case 218 regards a barking dog complaint. Some of the redactions of the police reports are in white. One document was not provided to Anhar until after litigation commenced. Notably, the City preliminarily partially blames Mr. Anhar for failing to contact counsel to correct the oversight in its Answer. The Opposition is rather less accusatory toward Petitioner.

Anhar and the City engaged in some meet and confer efforts. Anhar argues that the Answer in 218 does not comport with what actually happened as to estimates of when disclosure would actually occur. Anhar appears correct on this issue. 

The initially provided documents had white redactions which the City characterizes as uniquely vexing to Petitioner. This is not a complete discussion; the Court is also vexed and the City has represented to me that it would stop doing that. The Court has concerns that Mr. Anhar will be dealt with specially and white redactions will otherwise continue. 

Case 623 involves records regarding his neighbors' backyard cameras. Anhar made online reports about neighbors with cameras and alleges he is the victim of a violation of Penal Code section 647(j)(1). 

The Court notes that Anhar's reply on 623 contains many questions are not relevant to the Court's necessary findings in this case, which is limited to CPRA-related remedies. The Court further notes that Ms. Renteria does not represent herself as an attorney (or lawyer) and does not appear to be one. 

The Court wants to know exactly what documents have been withheld from Mr. Anhar in this case.

The Court has the following questions:

1. How is the media log generated?

2. Are the generalized questions sent by Anhar sufficient to give the City notice?

3. If they are not, how is a petitioner who is not Michael Anhar likely to know what specific records to ask for?

4. How does Anhar's observation that the information he initially received on 6884 was partially incorrect affect the analysis?

      5. Were there "invisible" redactions in 8008?

      6. What is the basis for asserting that Officer Kaufman spoke to the reporting party in 6884? (The Court notes that such discussion could have happened.)

      7. While the redactions in 218 are not hidden as in at least one of the prior petitions, the City represented to me that it would stop redacting with white redactions. What must I do to make it stop?

      8. What documents remain contested in 623?

 

Oral argument: The Court is, as noted above, aware of the litigation history of this case, and other cases dismissed by Mr. Anhar. The Court intends to view uncharitably uses of pejoratives (Petitioner's use of florid invective detracts from his well-organized briefing.)

The Court will allow argument on any issues, but again notes it is familiar with the filings. 

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-22-004042 – AGUEDA, ROBYN vs WALMART INC –  a) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories (set One) - GRANTED, and unopposed; b) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories (Set One) –  GRANTED, and unopposed; c)– Defendant’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission (Set One) Admitted -  GRANTED, and unopposed; d) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Responses to Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents (Set One) - GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) GRANTED, and unopposed. Regarding the Form Interrogatories, Set No. 1, served on Plaintiff Robyn Agueda, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery, and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(a).) Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiff Robyn Agueda to provide responses without objection to these form interrogatories within 14 days of service of the signed order.

 

The Court will change the date of the proposed order to May 1, 2025, and sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion.

b) GRANTED, and unopposed. Regarding the Special Interrogatories, Set No. 1, served on Plaintiff Robyn Agueda, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery, and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(a).) Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiff Robyn Agueda to provide responses without objection to these special interrogatories within 14 days of service of the signed order.

 

The Court will change the date of the proposed order to May 1, 2025, and sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion.  

c) GRANTED, and unopposed. The Court finds that Plaintiff has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery, and objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280(a).) Accordingly, the Court has no discretion but to grant Defendant’s motion. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c); St. Mary’s v. Superior Court (Schellenberg) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 777-778.) Defendant’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted as against Plaintiff Robyn Agueda.

 

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion

d) GRANTED, and unopposed. Regarding the Requests for Production, Set No. 1, served on Plaintiff Robyn Agueda, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has entirely failed to respond to the subject discovery, and all objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(a).) Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiff Robyn Agueda to provide responses without objection to these requests for production within 14 days of service of the signed order.

 

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

CV-24-004707 – ACCELERATED INVENTORY MANAGEMENT LLC vs CONTRERASCORTES, MIREYA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving papers, the Court finds that the Complaint states facts sufficient to constitute the stated cause of action against the Defendant, and the Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1)(A).) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.  Judgment shall be entered on the underlying debt in the amount of $5,063.30.

Plaintiff has also demonstrated entitlement to costs but has failed to submit evidence substantiating the claimed amount in that regard. Therefore, Plaintiff may pursue a cost award via cost memorandum to be submitted within the statutory time period.

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff; Plaintiff shall submit a revised form of judgment consistent with the Court’s ruling herein.

CV-24-004789 – BANK OF AMERICA NA vs GOMEZ, ANA YOLANDA ZEPEDA – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving papers and Defendant’s unequivocal admissions, which are subject to judicial notice, the Court finds that the Complaint states facts sufficient to constitute the stated causes of action against Defendant, and Defendant’s Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1)(A).) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.  Judgment shall be entered on the underlying debt in the amount of $4,907.32.

Plaintiff has also demonstrated entitlement to costs but has failed to submit evidence substantiating the claimed amount in that regard. Therefore, Plaintiff may pursue a cost award via cost memorandum to be submitted within the statutory time period.

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff; Plaintiff shall submit a revised form of judgment consistent with the Court’s ruling herein.

CV-24-009761 – STAGNO, MICHELLE vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – a) Defendant General Motors LLC’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint – OVERRULED; b) Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from Plaintiff’s Complaint (CCP 435, 436) - GRANTED, with leave to amend.

a) The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a claim for violation of the Unfair Competition Law, at a minimum with regard to the allegations of unlawful conduct in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Claims based on the “unlawful” prong of the UCL “borrow” violations of other laws and make those unlawful practices separately actionable through the UCL. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1383.) In light of this conclusion, the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on the defense’s arguments with regard to sufficiency of Plaintiff’s other allegations supporting the UCL claim.

b) Punitive damages are not available under the statutory causes of action alleged herein, i.e., the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the Unfair Competition Law.  However, the Court recognizes that certain of Plaintiff’s factual allegations suggest conduct that might give rise to a claim for punitive damages if sufficiently presented. Therefore, the Court will grant leave to amend in this regard.

Plaintiff shall submit her amended pleading within 20 days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-21-001296 – SHAW, NOLAN vs SOZA, ASHLEIGH – Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Order on General and Special Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – GRANTED in part, DENIED, in part.

 

The Court finds that the omission of Teri Nascimento as Administrator of Robert Carlson’s Estate in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was a result of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s mistake and or inadvertence. (Civ. Proc. Code § 473 (b)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the Court’s order on the Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint to the extent to which said order finds that Teri Nascimento’s omission from the Second Amended Complaint amounts to her dismissal with prejudice.  (Goodson v. Bogerts, Inc. (1967), 252 Cal.App.2d 32; Maynard v. Brandon (2005), 36 Cal.4th 364; Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432).

The Court declines to permit the correction of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as requested by Plaintiff.

However, the Court’s order on said demurrer is hereby amended to eliminate the paragraph wherein the Court states “As to the omission of Teri Nascimento as a defendant in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that the  legal effect of omitting a party from a subsequently amended complaint is that it operates as a dismissal of that party from the action, typically without prejudice, allowing for the possibility of reinstating the party in a future amended complaint, subject to the statute of limitations. (Mac v. Minassian, (2022)76 Cal.App.5th 510 ; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc., (2004)114 Cal.App.4th 1135); Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., (1987)195 Cal.App.3d 943). Therefore, Teri Nascimento’s omission from the Second Amended Complaint operates as a dismissal as to her without prejudice”.

Plaintiff is accordingly granted leave to amend his Second Amended Complaint by the filing of his Third Amended Complaint to include Teri Nascimento as a party in her capacity as the Administrator of the Estate of Robert Carlson.

CV-23-002989 – ALONSO, CRISTINE vs MOODY, ANGELA – a) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint – MOOT; b) Defendant’s Demurrer to the Complaint of Plaintiffs – SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

a) Given the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s companion demurrer, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is rendered moot.

b) The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Third cause of action for Intentional Tort does not state facts sufficient to state the asserted cause of action therein  (CCP § 430.10(e) & (f), California Rules of Court, Rule 2.112, Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.4th 612, 616, (citing text); A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.5th 677, 695, Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.3d 135, 139).

Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendants cannot rely on the same factual allegations as to Defendant’s conduct to support causes of action founded on negligence as well as an intentional tort, rendering said cause of action for Intentional Tort defective. (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.4th 1228, 1235-1236; Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.5th 602, 619; Chen v. PayPal, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.5th 559, 571-572; Manti v. Gunari, (1970)5 Cal. App. 3d 442,).

Plaintiff’s also fail to allege the required intent to support an Intentional Tort.( Katsaris v. Cook, (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 256; Carlsen v. Koivumaki, 227 Cal. App. 4th 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (2014); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Frake, (2011)197 Cal. App. 4th 568, Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 41).

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Intentional Tort is hereby sustained with leave to amend. (Code Civ Proc. §430.10(e); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.4th 968, 99).

Plaintiffs shall file their First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.

CV-24-010118 – FERNANDEZ, EDITH vs CHEVELLE, LINDSEY – Defendant’s Motion to Strike – HEARING REQUIRED.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint prior to the filing of Defendant’s present motion. However, this motion is directed at Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court requires clarification on this discrepancy.

In the interim, the Court is inclined to grant the motion based on a finding that the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not demonstrate the applicability of the” tort of another” doctrine that would warrant the prayer for attorney fees. Notably, said complaint even fails to make any allegations regarding any such third party. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1021 and 1021.6; Gray v. Don Miller & Assocs., Inc., (1984) 35 Cal. 3d 498; Watson v. Department of Transportation (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 885; (Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305; David S. Karton, a L. Corp. v. Musick, Peeler Garrett LLP, (2022)83 Cal. App. 5th 1027).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***