August 15, 2025

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-010035 – VALDEZ, JACQUELINE vs ALGHAZZI, WISSAM ALI – a) Cross-Defendant Jaqueline Valdez's Motion to Strike Amended Cross-Complaint AS SLAAP SUIT (CCP 425.16) – GRANTED in part. b) Cross-Defendant Jaqueline Valdez's Demurrer to Cross-Plaintiff Alghazzi's Amended Cross-Complaint- SUSTAINED in part without leave to amend, OVERRULED in part.  

a) The Court note preliminarily that the weight of the evidence is that Mr. Alghazzi received the motions timely and was not timely in his responses.

Cross-Defendants ask this Court to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) suit. Cross-Defendants must demonstrate that constitutionally protected speech is implicated. If so, Cross-Complainant must show a triable issue of material fact. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4^th 811.)  The Court can strike a cause of an action or factual allegations or both. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5^th 376.)

Where there is both protected speech and unprotected speech, the Court starts with analyzing whether there is protected speech. If there is, the Court determines whether unprotected speech as alleged gives Plaintiff a likelihood of success.

PROTECTED SPEECH IS IMPLICATED IN THIS CASE

The Dealer Cross-Complainant alleges three basic types of defamation: 1. Online reviews. 2. Statements to the Bureau of Automotive Repair and the Department of Motor Vehicles 3. A demand letter sent to the dealer.

Dealer claims three statements in reviews which Dealer asserts are defamatory:

1. They sell salvaged cars and lie about titles.
2. They overcharge and scam people.
3. They changed their name to avoid their bad reviews.

The second allegation is a protected statement of opinion. (See: Summit Bank v. Rogers (2012) 206 Cal.App.4^th 669, 695.)

Complaints to the Bureau of Automotive Repair and Department of Motor Vehicles are, at minimum, presumptively protected speech. (U.S. Const. Amend. 1, Code Civ. Proc. sec. 425.16(e)(1), Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4^th 1106.)

The demand letter sent to the Dealer is not alleged to have been otherwise published by Cross-Defendant Valdez. As such, it cannot be defamatory.

Thus, the remaining defamation issues are the following at least plausibly factual allegations:

1. They sell salvaged cars and lie about titles.

2. They changed their name to avoid bad reviews.

As to the first, the actual review included says, “I bought a car from them early this year in March a [2022 Honda Accord] and the car is salvaged completely damaged and selling it as clean title!!” [cleaned up] Later, “They buy salvaged cars that are not reported and sell them as clean title.”

As to the name change, Dealer includes in the Cross-Complaint an exchange in which Valdez alleges that “It is the same exact people running the business so therefore nothing has changed. My review will not be deleted.”

Dealer responds: “Oh please don’t delete the review. We already screenshotted it and will sue for defamation.”

Dealer, later, says, “Have a good day hun, you never purchased a vehicle here.”

Valdez has, at minimum, shifted the burden to Dealer to show that it is not the same people who ran or operated the dealership, or at least directly allege that. Dealer asserts the dealerships are “unrelated” without substantial further assertion. As such, this portion cannot survive.

The Court therefore strikes all references to the alleged defamation other than the

The defamation claim that remains after all this is the review alleging that the dealership is selling salvaged cars and lying about title. The actual review contains an assertion that six people had reached out to Valdez and had the same experience.

This includes factual allegations, and implications based on undisclosed facts. As such, this claim survives.

b) SUSTAINED in part without leave to amend, OVERRULED in part.

As analyzed above, the libel/defamation portion survives. Given the attachment of the actual review and the mildly increased precision of the allegations, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the remaining issue.

As to Intentional Interference with Business Relationships, the elements are:

1. An existing valid relationship between claimant and a third party.
2. Acts by the opposing party designed to disrupt the relationship.
3. Actual disruption of the relationship.
4. Economic harm.

Here, Dealer’s claim still does not contain information sufficiently establishing an existing relationship. (Nor is the claim quite sufficient for an intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.) Without an existing relationship with an identifiable buyer, the pleading fails. (See Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4^th 507.)

Dealer has allegations relating to angry customers but the allegations do not reach the proof required. The Court has permitted amendment and the Court declines to do so again.

As to harassment, there are civil harassment causes of action for restraining orders, but those are required to be brought via a mandatory form; further this is a claim for damages. The Court allowed modification of the cause of action, but this appears not to have occurred, and the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

Leave to amend was granted to allege a Cause of Action related to the harassment allegations, which does not appear to embrace a Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing cause of action. Further, Dealer has already received the benefit of the contract, and as such this Cause of Action must fail.

The parties are to meet and confer on the language of a Second Amended Cross-Complaint which includes only the surviving portion of the defamation claim.

CV-25-003378 – OLIVARES, BLANDINA vs COVENANT LIVING WEST – a) Plaintiff Martiriano Olivares’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel -GRANTED, and unopposed.  b) Plaintiff Maria Estela Olivares Hernandez’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel-GRANTED, and unopposed.  c) Plaintiff Crostobal Olivares’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel-GRANTED, and unopposed.  d) Plaintiff Maria Esperanza Olivares Hernandez’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel-GRANTED, and unopposed.  e) Plaintiff Amelia Olivares’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel-GRANTED, and unopposed.  f) Plaintiff Blandina Olivares’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel; GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) GRANTED, and unopposed. However, the Court fails to locate a proposed order on file for this motion, despite the fact that proof of service indicates one was served with the moving papers. Therefore, counsel shall provide a form of proposed order on the required Judicial Council form for the Court’s signature. 

In addition, the effective date of the order shall be delayed until counsel submits proof of service of the signed order on the client. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1362(e).)

b-f) GRANTED, and unopposed. The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by counsel. In addition, the effective date of the order shall be delayed until counsel submits proof of service of the signed order on the client. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1362(e).)

CV-25-004154 – GARRETTSTEINMAN, DANIEL PAUL vs SIERRA CLUB – a) Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Extension of Time to File Demurrer to Answer and Motion to Strike- DENIED. b) Plaintiff’s Amended Demurrer to Answer - MOOT upon filing of amended answer. c) Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Strike - DENIED.

The Court inquired of the parties at the hearing on Wednesday. If the Court reached the merits on the Motion to Strike, it would be denied as Plaintiff has placed his mental health at issue.

As to the Demurrer, Defendants concede some defects in the Answer and have proposed cures to those defects. As such, given the unusual procedural posture of the case, the Court specifically invited and now accepts the request to file an Amended Answer. Such Answer is to be filed within seven days.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-20-001720 – CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION ALLIANVE vs EASTERN SAN JOAQUIN GROUNDWATER AUTHORITY – a) Defendant South San Joaquin Irrigation District, ET AL.’s, Motion to Dismiss - HEARING REQUIRED.  b) Plaintiff California Sportfishing Protection Alliance’s Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate – HEARING REQUIRED.

a) Motion to Dismiss

The Court is inclined to DENY the motion but will hear argument on this matter.

b) Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint

The Court would like to discuss this motion in relation to the Court’s prior ruling construing the statutory sections at issue.

CV-20-003624 – LOPEZ, BENJAMIN JR vs JOHNSON, KAREN EMILY – a) Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict- HEARING REQUIRED. b) Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial – HEARING REQUIRED.

a) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

By way of this motion, Defendants City of Turlock and Karen Emily Johnson ask the Court to render a judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. The Court will hold a hearing on this matter but is currently inclined to DENY the motion.

b) Motion for New Trial

By way of this motion, Defendants City of Turlock and Karen Emily Johnson ask the Court for a new trial. The Court will hold a hearing on this matter but is currently inclined to DENY the motion.

CV-23-005215 – GONZALEZ, JAVIER GIOVANI ALVAREZ vs KING, VELVETROSE CATHERINE MAE – Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED.

Legal Standards for Summary Judgment

A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact….” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, as modified (July 11, 2001) (Aguilar).) “A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id., at p. 851.) A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies its initial burden by proving either that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense. (Ibid.) The facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom must be accepted as true. (Villacres v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575.)

“Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed.” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant’s burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

There Are Triable Issues of Material Fact

Here, there are triable issues of material fact. (See, e.g., SUF Nos. 6-10.) Indeed, this case offers a quintessence of issues that must be resolved by the trier of fact. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

CV-24-007697 – DUARTE, MAYKEL GAMALIEL vs DRYCO CONSTRUCTION INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Complaint in Intervention by Loya Casualty Insurance Company – DENIED without prejudice.

The motion is procedurally defective. It was untimely served only 17 court days before the hearing instead of 18 court days as required by Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1005(b), 1013(g), and 1010(a)(3)(B). Moving Party may also wish to note that the physical address on its proof of service for the Wilshire Law Firm, PLC, does not match the address indicated on the notice of change of address that was filed with the Court on July 3, 2025.

PR-23-000706 – a) Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Response to Form Interrogatories Set One to Andrew Martin and Request for Sanctions-– CONTINUED to August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 2. b) Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Response to Production of Documents Set One to Andrew Martin and Request for Sanctions-– CONTINUED to August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. c) Notice of Motion and Motion to Compel Response to Special Interrogatories Set one to Andrew Martin and Request for Sanctions-– CONTINUED to August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22. d) Notice of Motion And Motion to Compel Response to Admissions Set One to Andrew Martin and Request for Sanctions -– CONTINUED to August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22;

a) - d)

These matters are continued to August 22, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 22, to be heard with related motions on calendar for that date.

 

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

CV-24-002665 – GERGEES, DORIS vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Deposiiton of Defendant’s Person(s) Most Knowledgeable, With Production of Documents – DROPPED, at the request of the moving party.

CV-24-007305 – CITIBANK NA vs BARRERA, LUIS – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order that Matters in Request for Admission of Truth of Facts be Deemed Admitted – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The Court finds that Defendant has failed to respond to the subject discovery entirely and objections have been waived. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(a).)  Accordingly, the Court has no discretion but to grant Plaintiff’s request.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c); St. Mary’s v. Superior Court (Schellenberg) (2014) 223 Cal.App.4^th 762, 777-778.). The matters contained in Request for Admissions, Set One, are deemed admitted. 

The Court will sign the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff.

CV-25-001199 – ALMANZA, KRISTOPHER vs MODESTO ON ICE INC – Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint – OVERRULED.

The Court finds that the pleading, as amended, sufficiently alleges facts supporting the general negligence claim at this stage. Specifically, the Court declines to conclude that the Second Amended Complaint constitutes a “sham pleading,” in view of the ambiguities in the previous version with regard to the existence of a written liability waiver and Plaintiff’s explanation as offered herein.

CV-25-005435 – IN RE 517 FORT HENRY DRIVE MODESTO CA 95354 – Petitioner’s Petition Regarding Unresolved Claims and Deposit of Undistributed Surplus Proceeds of Trustee’s Sale – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion, to November 18, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 23.

Upon review of the papers herein, the Court notes that the declaration of Elizabeth Shryock purports to identify multiple heirs of the deceased deed holder, who may qualify as potential claimants herein but were not identified by the Trustee’s initial investigation. As it appears that such individuals did not receive notice of the instant proceedings, and no contact information for them is presently provided, the Court finds that the matter cannot be adjudicated at this juncture. 

Therefore, the Court’s 6-16-25 order granting the Trustee’s Petition is vacated, and the matter is continued for a further hearing on the Petition, as above.  The Trustee is directed to locate and provide notice of these proceedings to the additional potential claimants as identified in Ms. Shryock’s declaration and to submit an amended petition and/or status report advising the Court of the results of such efforts by November 10, 2025. 

The Courtroom Clerk shall serve a copy of the Court’s minute order in this regard on the Trustee.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-22-005396 – CENDEJAS, SANTOS MENDOZA vs E&J GALLO WINERY – Compliance Hearing – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes the Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the Court’s order of July 30, 2025, ordering the filing of an updated compliance report by August 12, 2025. Given said non-compliance, the Court continues this matter to August 29, 2005, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this court for the filing of the said update compliance report .

Said report shall be filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the next hearing date. The Court fully expects total compliance with this order.

 

CV-23-002640 – QUINTERO, JESSICA vs JUAREZ, JOSE HORACIO VEGA, JR – a) Defendant's Motion to Compel (1) Further Attendance and Testimony of Plaintiff Jessica Quintero; (2) Answers to Deposition Questions;(3) Production of Documents and Privilege Log; and (4) Monetary and other Sanctions- GRANTED. b) Defendants Motion to Conitnue Trial Date and Corresponding Pre-Trial Dates – GRANTED, unopposed.

a) The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to take Defendant Plaintiff Ms. Quintero’s deposition and that the items of enquiry sought by Defendant’s Counsel are discoverable  (Code of Civil Procedure §§ § 2017.010, 2025.250; 2025.280 (a), 2025.280; Slaieh v. Superior Ct. of Riverside Cnty., (2022)77 Cal. App. 5th 266;  Tatkin v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 745; Brown v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1949) 34 Cal.2d 559; Williams v. Superior Ct., (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 531; Cruz v. Superior Ct., (2004)121 Cal. App. 4th 646). 

The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s Counsel impermissibly instructed Plaintiff not to respond to Defendant’s Counsel’s valid deposition questions.  (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 101).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause, and the Court finds no basis to limit the scope of Plaintiff’s second deposition and hereby declines to do so.

Taking into consideration Plaintif’s asserted challenges with obtaining the requested documents,  the fact that the deposition notice at issue was served on June 19, 2025, the Plaintiff’s second deposition shall take place within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order.  Plaintiff shall also produce the agreed upon privilege log within ten (10) days of the date of this order.

Plaintiff’s Counsel shall not improperly direct Ms. Quintero not to answer valid and relevant questions at said deposition, unless validly based on the assertion of the attorney client privilege.

The Court notes Plaintiff’s willingness to submit herself for a second deposition to provide the requested documents and to refrain from inappropriately instructing her client not to answer deposition questions. However, discovery is supposed to be self-executing. (Clement v Alegre  (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277). Furthermore, had Plaintiff’s Counsel engaged in meet and confer in good faith after Plaintiff’s deposition, this motion would not have been necessary.

Accordingly, monetary sanctions of $692.50 are imposed against Plaintiff for Defendant’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2023.010, 2023.030, 2025.450 (g)(1),  2025.480 (j) ;Tucker v. Pac. Bell Mobile Servs., (2010) 186 Cal. App. 4th 1548; In re Marriage of Lemen, (1980)113 Cal.App.3d 769).

b) Good cause existing, Defendant’s motion to continue trial herein is granted. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332).

The current trial date of September 16, 2025, is hereby vacated. A Case Management Conference for  trial setting is hereby scheduled for September 2, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court. No appearance is necessary for this motion.

CV-23-003515 – SANTIAGO, CHRISTINA EVA vs CENTER FOR HUMAN SERVICES – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

Due to issues with the Court’s calendar, this matter is continued to August 20, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

CV-25-001111 – PLASCENCIA, ELINA vs QUEST DIAGNOSTOTICS INCORPORATED – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings – CONTINUED, on the Court own motion.

The Court requires additional time to review the pleadings in this matter.

Accordingly, this matter is continued to August 20, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court.

CV25-002813 – CONNECT BY AMERICAN FAMILY vs VELTHOEN, JEFF – Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Due to Statute of Limitation - DENIED.

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint involves a subrogation claim for uninsured motorist bodily injury payments made to Plaintiff’s insured for which the statute of limitations is three (3) years from the date of payment by the insured. (Code section § 21580.2 (g); Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Companies v. Colony Kitchens (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 140;  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973), 8 Cal.3d 712).

This special period of limitations applicable solely to subrogation claims against an uninsured motorist by an insurer which has paid its insured's claims takes precedence over the period of limitations applicable to the personal injury claims of the insured.  (West American Ins. Co. v. Chalk (1989),213 Cal.App.3d 825). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is hereby denied.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings in Department 19***