Civil Tentative Rulings

April 15, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-25-009253 – GARCIA, ZULEICA vs DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES – Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandate – DENIED.

Petitioner raises two issues: The propriety of the DMV hearing itself, alleging that the adjudicator was also an advocate in violation of the rule articulated in California DUI Laws. Assn. v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, (2022) 77 Cal. App. 5th 517, and that there was insufficient evidence of the blood alcohol limit given the adjudicator’s incorrect finding of who signed one of the documents.

ADJUDICATOR-ADVOCATE RULE

Respondent contends that the argument is forfeited, and cites to non-DMV administrative cases for its position.

On the merits of the adjudicator-advocate issue, Respondent cites to Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5^th 186 for the proposition that collecting evidence and ruling does not, in itself, render the verdict void.

But Respondent fails to mention that Knudsen rejected what appears to be the identical forfeiture argument made here. There is a forfeiture here, and it is Respondent’s for failing to argue or state that Petitioner’s forfeiture is discretionary and why this Court ought to use its discretion to enforce it. Respondent has made the choice to cite the case for the propositions that assist it and ignore the case for the propositions which do not.

Whether Respondent wishes to continue to make that choice in other cases is up to it. 

Reaching the merits, the Knudsen court makes clear that simply accepting the written evidence does not violate the adjudicator-advocate rule. In Knudsen, the adjudicator asked non-neutral questions of Knudsen’s expert, and issued a ruling that appeared to rely on the answers to those questions in a manner not presented by either the paperwork submitted nor Knudsen nor the expert. Each case must be resolved on the facts presented, and the record of this hearing was almost purely a submission on the paperwork.

There was no violation of the adjudicator-advocate rule.

FACTUAL ANALYSIS

The Court engages in an independent judgment standard of review. I do not view the definition of “independent judgment” in the case law as a model of clarity, but the Court must determine whether the requirements were met by a preponderance of the evidence, and whether the adjudicator’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

In this case, based on the reports, Petitioner was stopped in the early morning of May 3, 2025 by officers Castro and Lewis after running a red light at Needham and McHenry. Petitioner denied drinking, but her speech was slurred and she smelled of alcohol.

She later told the police she stopped drinking at 8 p.m., about five hourse before the stop.  Police stopped the walk-and-turn field sobriety test because it appeared she would fall over.

Officer Castro requested that she do a preliminary alcohol screening breath test, where the results were 0.15%, 0.13% and 0.16%. He signed both the screening test and breath test documents. Officer Lewis was signed into the breath test machine when Officer Castro signed it, and the adjudicator incorrectly asserted in her ruling that Officer Lewis signed it.

Under Gerwig v. Gordon (2021) 61 Cal.App.5^th 59 the breath test results are presumptively valid. In order to defeat this presumption, Petitioner must show that there was a Title 17 violation that bears some reasonable relation to the reliability of the results.

Petitioner asserts that Officer Castro was not a qualified operator of the machine because he would have signed into the machine had he been one. But Petitioner offers no evidence other than that assumption. Because the legal presumption of accuracy puts the onus on Petitioner to demonstrate error, the allegation that he was not qualified is insufficient.

Further, other evidence of Petitioner’s intoxication is abundant. In this case, Petitioner could not walk and turn because she could not stand. She lied about not drinking. She ran a red light.

For these reasons the petition is denied.

CV-26-001573 – DONOHUE, JENNIE JEAN vs CITY OF OAKDALE – Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Mandate –DENIED, without prejudice.

Petitioner’s Petition fails to demonstrate proof of service of the Petition and supporting pleadings on  Respondent. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1107, 1005 (c) , and 1010).

Due process requires that proper notice of an action be given to a party and this requirement is not satisfied by actual knowledge without notification conforming to the statutory requirements. (Ursino v. Superior Ct., (1974) 39 Cal. App. 3d 611).

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-22-001377 – ESPINOZA BAIL BONDS INC vs GONZALES, ANDRES – Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment – DENIED without prejudice.

Prior to the submission of the instant motion, a default judgment was entered against Defendants on November 28, 2023. On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend and correct judgment to change the Plaintiff’s name from ESPINOZA BAIL BONDS, INC. to the true name of JOSE ESPINOZA dba ESPINOZA BAIL BONDS. No opposition or reply was filed.

“The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d).) “Section 473 does not authorize a court to add for the first time a party not named in the complaint.” (Meller & Snyder v. R & T Properties, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313 n.5. [“[W]e question whether it can be seriously argued that R & T Properties, Inc. is the same entity as Mr. Tieger, an individual, dba R & T Properties.”].)

Here, through error on the part of Plaintiff's counsel, the complaint erroneously identified Espinoza Bail Bonds, Inc., as the party plaintiff. All of the subsequent case proceedings and Plaintiff’s subsequent pleadings—including Plaintiff’s request for entry of default and court judgment—bear the erroneous name of the Plaintiff. The error of Plaintiff’s counsel in naming an incorrect or nonexistent party as the party plaintiff is not merely a clerical mistake in the default judgment entered by the Court. Rather, California courts have held that a corporation and an individual sole proprietor operating under a fictitious business name are separate legal entities, and substituting one for the other constitutes adding a new party rather than correcting a clerical error. (See Meller & Snyder v. R & T Properties, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313 n.5.) The motion to amend or correct judgment is DENIED without prejudice.

The conclusion of Plaintiff’s memorandum makes a passing request for alternative relief by asking the Court to vacate the default and set aside the judgment so that Plaintiff may amend the complaint to correct the Plaintiff’s name. Plaintiff’s request for alternative relief is procedurally defective. The request for alternative relief is not included in the notice of motion or motion, nor does Plaintiff’s filing appear to fully comply with the notice of motion and motion requirements of California Rules of Court 3.1110 and 3.1112. Therefore, the Court will not address the request for alternative relief. The Court notes that a motion to set aside a void judgment under Section 473 requires “notice to the other party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d).) Yet Plaintiff’s Proof of Service does not indicate the manner of service to defendants, nor is it signed.

The Court also notes that the five-year rule has not yet run, but that the parties should be aware of the issue.

CV-23-001140 – CONTRERAS, MARIA vs ASHLEY FURNITURE HOME STORE – Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Cross-Complaint Against Ashley Furniture Home Store and Ashley Furniture Industries LLC – GRANTED, and unopposed.

On March 12, 2026, Defendant and Cross-Complainant GBS Warranty Services LLC (“GBS”) moved for leave to file a First Amended Cross-Complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 473

and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324. The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities, the Declaration of Catherine S. Meulemans, and a redline showing GBS’s proposed amendments. GBS seeks to add a cause of action for express indemnity against Cross-Defendants Ashley Furniture Home Store and Ashley Furniture Industries, LLC (“Ashley”). The motion is unopposed.

“The court may . . . in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) “Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.) “Such amendments generally may occur ‘at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice’ (§ 576) so long as the amendments do not raise new issues against which the opposing party has had no opportunity to defend. [Citations.]” (Doe v. Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 577.)

Here, GBS initially filed a cross-complaint against Ashley for equitable indemnity, implied indemnity, comparative indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief on or about June 11, 2024. Ashley Furniture Industries, LLC answered on July 15, 2024. Trial has been scheduled for September 15, 2026.

Plaintiff Ms. Contreras was deposed on December 19, 2025. According to GBS, Plaintiff testified that Cross-defendants Ashley “made certain unauthorized representations to Plaintiff to convince Plaintiff to purchase the furniture protection Plan,” including that “it was a good idea to purchase the furniture protection plan because GBS would be obligated to ‘make the furniture new for [her].’” (Memorandum at 2; Meulemans Decl., ¶ 3.) GBS contends that a Service Agreement between GBS and Ashley requires Ashley to defend and indemnify GBS in the event such unauthorized representations were made. Therefore, GBS seeks to add a cause of action for express indemnity against Ashley “to preserve its defense and indemnity rights under the indemnification provision of the Service Agreement.” (Memorandum at 5; Meulemans Decl., ¶ 9.) GBS contends that there is no prejudice because the amendment does not seek to add new parties and because discovery is still ongoing.

Having considered GBS’s motion, memorandum and accompanying declaration, and proposed amendments, the Court GRANTS GBS’s motion for leave to file first amended cross-complaint against Ashley Furniture Home Store and Ashley Furniture Industries LCC. GBS shall file the amended cross-complaint within the next five (5) court days.

PR-22-001064 – Estate of NUNES, CLARA CONSTANCE – Third Party Richard J Perry’s Motion to Determine Stolen Property – DENIED.

A motion is not the proper procedural vehicle to adjudicate claims regarding allegedly stolen estate property. Such determinations require a properly noticed probate petition invoking the Court’s statutory authority.

In addition, the relief sought is duplicative of objections already filed to the personal representative’s final account and report. Any disputes regarding missing assets, valuation issues, or alleged fiduciary misconduct may be litigated and resolved through the accounting trial, including any request for surcharge or other appropriate remedies.

No further action will be taken on the motion.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-006783 – MID VALLEY POWER vs MICHELS, DIRK – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement – Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement – GRANTED. b) Defendant's Motion to Seal Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mid Valley Power and Cross-Defendant Tyler Ott’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement – GRANTED, and unopposed.

a) The Court finds that the parties entered into a valid, binding and enforceable settlement agreement (memorandum of understanding) on 10-30-25, which sufficiently provides the essential material terms of their agreement. With regard to the parties’ dispute over the timing of Defendants’ performance as contemplated by the written agreement, the Court finds that the agreement does not make Plaintiff’s completed performance a condition precedent to Defendant’s obligation to perform, and Defendant was bound by law to perform the stated obligations within a reasonable time. (Civ. Code § 1657.) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED and Defendant is ordered to perform its agreed-to obligations immediately. 

The Court further orders that the action be dismissed without prejudice, with the Court’s retention of jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the settlement terms until its completion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6(a).)  Upon completion of the required settlement terms, Plaintiffs may submit a request for dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6(g).

b) The Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that the subject materials contain confidential settlement terms and mediation communications that are protected by California law, implicating the parties’ overriding privacy interests, and that a substantial probability exists that such interests will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed with regard to such materials. In addition, the scope of the information to be shielded from disclosure is sufficiently narrow, as only the references to confidential information have been redacted from the publicly available versions of the subject documents. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 2.550.) 

CV-25-000613 – LOPEZ, CORRINA PAULA vs DUNHOUSE, ROBERT FRANCIS, III – Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – HEARING REQUIRED.

The proof of service contained in the Court’s file demonstrates only that notice of the motion and the continued hearing date were served on the client and opposing counsel. Therefore, counsel shall appear to demonstrate to the Court whether all components of the instant motion (including counsel’s supporting declaration and a proposed order) have been served on the client and on opposing counsel with proper notice as required by Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).

CV-25-003237 – WELLS FARGO BANK NA vs FLORES, ISAAC A – Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and of Non-Appearance – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Based on the moving papers and the Court’s 12-9-25 order deeming matters admitted, the Court finds that the Complaint states facts sufficient to constitute the stated causes of action against Defendant, and Defendant’s Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1)(A).) Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.  Judgment shall be entered on the underlying debt in the amount of $7,681.63.

In addition, Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to the claimed costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,225.00. (Civ. Code § 1717; Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032, 1033.5.)

The Court will sign the proposed order and judgment submitted by Plaintiff.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-23-001643 – EDVALSON, ERIC, III VS CITY OF MODESTO – Defendant City of Modesto’s Motion for Summary Judgment – CONTINUED, by parties’ stipulation.

The hearing on this motion is continued to June 25, 2026, per the parties’ stipulation.  

CV-24-009989 – OWENS, CHARLES vs SMITH GAMBRELL & RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL LLP – Compliance Hearing – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court acknowledges the declarations of Anderew Cassey of Epiq Class Actions and notes that neither declaration attests to the disbursement of the Settlement Funds to Class Counsel, (Attorney’s Fees and Costs) Class Representative nor Settlement Administrator. The Court requires confirmation as to those payments.

CV-25-010341 – COUNTY OF STANISLAUS vs MARING, ZACHARY J – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order of Prejudgment Possession – HEARING REQUIRED.

The Court is inclined to grant the motion but would like to hear from the parties as to the status of Defendant’s continued and future access to their property and to the irrigation pump for the continued watering of their almond orchard.  

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***