Civil Tentative Rulings

September 24, 2026

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-010016 – REEVES, MARNIE ANN vs RENNER, JEREMY LEE – Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Memorandum of Costs, or, in the Alternative, to Tax Costs – GRANTED in part.

The motion is GRANTED in the amount of $4,650.00, reducing costs to $7,205.45. “A prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.) Plaintiff does not present any authority establishing an exception on the basis of indigency.

The prior discovery sanctions are not recoverable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, but rather constitute a separate order.

The Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on July 9, 2026. Judgment was entered on July 29, 2026. On August 6, 2026, Defendant filed a Memorandum of Costs seeking costs in the amount of $7,205.45. On August 7, 2026, Defendant filed another Memorandum of Costs seeking costs in the amount of $11,855.45. On August 12, 2026, an Amended Judgment was entered.

CV-25-008039 – MID VALLEY AGRICULTURAL SERVICES INC vs KATICICH RANCH LLC – Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 664.6 – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to enforce the parties’ written settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 is GRANTED as to the unpaid settlement amount of $271,184.46 and interest of $6,787.16.

On July 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to enforce settlement agreement. On September 3, 2026, this matter was previously continued on information that Defendant had just retained counsel. There is no opposition in the Court file.

The parties executed a written stipulation authorizing entry of judgment in the event of default, and the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration establishing that Defendant has failed to make any payment towards the principal amount due under the settlement agreement or the daily interest of $117.02 due after November 31, 2025. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amount of $277,971.62.

Costs

Plaintiff also seeks an award of $60.00 in costs as filing fees for the instant motion. Paragraph 2 of the parties’ settlement agreement states that each party is to pay its own costs and attorneys’ fees. The request for costs is DENIED.

Proposed Order & Proposed Judgment

The proposed order submitted by Plaintiff includes an award of costs. Because the Court has denied Plaintiff's request for costs, Plaintiff shall submit a revised proposed order accurately reflecting this ruling within five court days. Plaintiff is also directed to serve and submit a proposed judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

CV-26-004134 – JACOPETTI, JOSHUA vs RAMOS, RUSSELL F – Defendant’s Demurrer to Complaint – OVERRULED as MOOT.

On August 26, 2026, Defendants filed the instant demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint. The original complaint was superseded by the First Amended Complaint filed on September 11, 2026. Consequently, the demurrer to the original complaint is OVERRULED as MOOT.

CV-26-007991 – VASQUEZ, SUSANA vs CITY OF HUGHSON – Petitioner’s Petition for Relief from the Claim Presentation Requirement (Gov. Code 946.6) - DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

Petitioner Vasquez was elected council member for the City of Hughson in November, 2024. She alleges seriously improper behavior by Mayor George Carr occurred on July 14, 2025 and November 10, 2025. On June 25, 2026, Petitioner retained counsel and submitted a claim and a request for leave to file the late claim on June 30, 2026. This was denied by the City, and the petition was filed on August 11, 2026.

Petitioner first reported the July 14, 2025 behavior “within several weeks” to the city attorney and city manager. They told her to resolve the issue with Mayor Carr and took no other action.

Petitioner reported the November 10, 2025 incident the next day. The City retained an investigator, who wrote a letter sustaining the allegations in a letter dated March 9, 2026. Petitioner asked “What happens next?” and the City said that the council is a self-regulating body.

On May 26, 2026, the city formally censured Mayor Carr.

ANALYSIS

This petition addresses only the issue of permitting a late-filed claim, not the merits of the underlying factual claims against Mayor Carr.

Government Code section 945.4 requires a claim within six months. Section 946.6 demonstrates the showing necessary to overcome a city’s denial of a late claim. First, the petition must be filed within a year of the denial by the City. Second, the application was denied. Both of these are met.

The third is that Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to present a timely claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. None of these are present.

Petitioner accurately notes that the comparison to a “reasonably prudent person” is the touchstone. (Department of Water and Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App. 4^th 1288.)

In this case, Petitioner was looking for an “amicable resolution,” and was told after the first incident that the City was not going to take action. At no point did Petitioner expressly make a monetary claim until the late-filed claim. Petitioner asserts that the ongoing investigation would cause a reasonably prudent person to wait, but there was no investigation from July to November of 2025. And the investigation was still with the caveat that the council was self-regulating.

Plaintiff’s cases do not support her claim of excusable neglect. In Bertorelli v. City of Tulare (1986) 18 Cal.App.3d 432, the Court indicated that if there are ongoing settlement discussions over the 100-day claim period (at that time) combined with false statements provided by Tulare about those settlement discussions was enough to overcome the reasonably prudent person standard.

The facts in DeVore v. California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4^th 454 are extraordinary and not comparable to this case. In DeVore, plaintiffs discovered the reason for alleged liability at a criminal preliminary hearing months after the collision that killed their family member. Within six months of the time they learned those facts, they filed a claim.

In Syzemore v. County of Sacramento (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 517, the analysis of excusable mistake is brief and on the facts presented not generalizable. In that case, the ruling was primarily that a military stay statute applied and therefore the application was timely in any event.

The only potential mistake or excusable neglect here is the lack of knowledge of the six-month filing requirement, which, without more, does not constitute cause to permit the late filing. (Harrison v. County of Del Norte (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 7). Even were Vasquez not an elected city council member, her claim would have to be denied. But she cannot effectively claim to be a layperson on the issue of city claims.

The Court does not reach the prejudice issue, but if it did it would not find prejudice to the City in the late filing.

City to provide an order consistent with this ruling.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-24-004072 – ZOLLIN, TIMOTHY vs BORRAYES, ALBIN HELVIE DE LEON – Defendants Albin Helvie De Leon Borrayes and Pacific Agri-Products Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative for Summary Adjudication – DENIED.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, is DENIED in its entirety.

GOVERNING LAW

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that a cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; consequently, the moving party's evidence is strictly construed, the opposing party's evidence is liberally construed, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the opposing party. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-851; Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038; Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.)

The pleadings frame the issues on summary judgment, and the moving party's burden is measured against the allegations of the operative pleading. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)

A motion for summary adjudication is subject to separate procedural requirements. The notice of motion and separate statement must identify each issue to be adjudicated, and the separate statement must set forth all material facts claimed to be undisputed with respect to each issue. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350.) Summary adjudication may only be granted if it completely disposes of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request judicial notice that the applicable speed limit at the intersection of Patterson Road and Snedigar Road was 55 miles per hour. Defendants contend the issue is subject to judicial notice because Patterson Road was an undivided highway and therefore subject to the default speed limit established by Vehicle Code section 22349, subdivision (b).

The request relies on declarations, photographs, municipal records, aerial imagery, and other evidence to establish the requested factual predicate.

Because the Court resolves the motion on procedural grounds and without reaching the merits of defendants' speed-limit argument, the Court declines to reach the request.

The Request for Judicial Notice is consequently DENIED as MOOT.

OBJECTIONS

Plaintiffs filed extensive objections to Defendants' evidence, including objections directed to the declarations of Borrayes, Kegley, Merala, and Kenney. Defendants similarly filed objections to portions of Plaintiffs' expert declaration from Herbert.

Because the Court's ruling does not depend upon resolution of those evidentiary disputes, the Court DECLINES to rule on the objections pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (q).

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment

Defendants contend all causes of action against them fail because Borrayes was not negligent and because there is no evidence the truck was negligently maintained.

The Court finds summary judgment inappropriate. Plaintiffs identify numerous disputed issues concerning Borrayes's conduct before the collision, including evidence that he observed Melton's vehicle before impact (AMF No. 4), continued "driving normally" after observing the vehicle (AMF No. 9), did not brake before impact (AMF No. 14), did not attempt to steer away (AMF No. 15), and made no evasive maneuver before the collision (AMF No. 84). Plaintiffs additionally present expert opinion concerning alleged failures to observe, recognize, and respond to a developing traffic hazard. (See AMF Nos. 26-84.)

Defendants vigorously challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and argue Plaintiffs' expert's opinions are unsupported, speculative, and inconsistent with the underlying facts. However, based on the record presented, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that no triable issue exists regarding negligence, causation, or comparative fault.

Accordingly, summary judgment is DENIED.

II. Summary Adjudication – Issue No. 1

Issue No. 1 seeks adjudication of Plaintiffs' causes of action for General Negligence, Negligence Based on Vehicle Code Sections 22350 and 22450, Negligent Entrustment, and Motor Vehicle Negligence.

Although the issue is properly identified in both the notice of motion and the separate statement, Defendants attempt to adjudicate four separate causes of action through a single issue. The separate statement contains only seventeen operative material facts. Those facts concern the circumstances of the collision, including speed, right-of-way, the stop-sign violation, the path of the truck, distance, and timing. (See SUF Nos. 1-17.)

The separate statement does not identify separately stated material facts directed to the elements of negligent entrustment, including Pacific Agri's knowledge, entrustment, training, supervision, competency assessments, or other facts uniquely relevant to that cause of action. (See id.)

Because the separate statement fails to adequately identify all material facts necessary to adjudicate all causes of action encompassed within Issue No. 1, summary adjudication of Issue No. 1 is DENIED. (See United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337, superseded by statute on inapposite grounds as stated in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 952; Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 160.)

III. Summary Adjudication – Issue No. 2

Issue No. 2 seeks summary adjudication of plaintiffs' punitive damages allegations.

The separate statement contains no separately stated punitive-damages facts. Instead, Defendants merely incorporate by reference the facts supporting Issue No. 1. The separate statement contains no separately stated facts concerning malice, oppression, fraud, despicable conduct, conscious disregard, ratification, managerial authorization, or any other issue specifically pertinent to punitive damages.

Because the separate statement fails to identify separately stated material facts supporting adjudication of the punitive damages issue, summary adjudication of Issue No. 2 is also DENIED. (See United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 337, superseded by statute on inapposite grounds as stated in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 952; Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 160.)

IV. Reply Arguments Do Not Cure the Defects

On reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim fails because Pacific Agri admits that Borrayes acted within the course and scope of his employment and therefore the negligent entrustment claim is barred under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148.

Whether or not that argument is ultimately persuasive, the separate statement does not identify as a separately stated undisputed material fact that Pacific Agri admits course-and-scope employment or vicarious liability. Rather, Defendants attempt to rely on declaration sections cited for the first time on reply.

Further, Defendants did not separately identify negligent entrustment as its own issue for summary adjudication. Defendants instead included it within Issue No. 1.

The Court therefore concludes that the reply arguments do not cure the deficiencies in the motion or separate statement.

CV-26-003882 – PADILLA, JOHN PAUL vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC – Defendant’s Petition to Compel Arbitration – CONTINUED, pending hearing on the COURT’S MOTION RE CONSOLIDATION (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048) on October 29, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 22.

The Court notes that the parties are involved in a related case, CV26-6441, which is currently pending in Department 23 with a similar petition to compel arbitration set for hearing in January 2027.

Code of Civ. Proc. § 1048(a) provides that when actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Under the circumstances, the Court believes that consolidation of the related cases herein may be in order, either (1) for all purposes or (2) at a minimum, for hearing and determination of the issues presented by the arbitration petitions.

Therefore, the Court sets a hearing on its own Motion for Consolidation, as above. The parties are directed to meet and confer as to the potential scope of consolidation and shall submit briefing with regard to their respective positions no later than October 15, 2026.

The hearing on the instant motion is CONTINUED, to be rescheduled after the consolidation motion has been resolved.

CV-26-004906 – FLORY, RYAN T vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA – Defendant’s Motion to compel Binding Arbitration - DENIED, without prejudice.

The instant case is a lemon law action filed after January 1, 2025. Therefore, it appears the action is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26. Section 871.26 requires, inter alia, that “[w]ithin 90 days after filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties shall schedule a mediation to occur within 150 days after filing of the answer or other responsive pleading with a court-appointed or private mediator.” Except for initial disclosures and the initial depositions, “all other discovery shall be stayed until mediation is concluded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.26.)

The Court previously invited supplemental pleading on the application of the above-referenced statute, and Defendant’s arguments do not identify any authority requiring the Court to determine the issues presented in the instant motion before the statutory requirements are met. Therefore, the motion appears premature at this stage.

Accordingly, in view of Defendant’s election to participate in the proceedings prescribed by Code Civ. Proc. § 871.20 et seq., the instant motion appears to be premature and is DENIED, without prejudice. Defendant may re-file its motion to compel after mediation is concluded.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-20-002421 – SINGH, RUPINDER vs SINGH, SARBINDER – Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED.

The Court notes that the proposed order contains the appropriate admonishment to the corporate client regarding the need to retain counsel and will sign the same.

The effectiveness of the order shall be delayed until proof of service of the signed order on the client is submitted. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1362(e).)  Counsel is directed to ensure service of the signed order on the individual client as well as the designated agent for service of the corporate client.

CV-24-009805 – JANE DOE 1 vs RIVERBANK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT – a) Specially Appearing Cross-Defendant Egidio “Jeep” Oliveira’s Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default Judgment – DENIED; b) Specially Appearing Cross-Defendant Egidio “Jeep” Oliveira’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Cross-Complaint – DENIED.

a-b) The Court finds Cross-Complainant’s Proof of Service of Summons and supporting declarations (of mailing and diligence) demonstrate valid substitute service. (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20.)  As Cross-Defendant has submitted no evidence in support of the instant motions, he has not overcome the presumption of valid service pursuant to Evid. Code § 647.

CV-26-007555 – SINGH, AMANDEEP vs DHILLON, AMRITPAL, SINGH – Plaintiff Amandeep Singh’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement – DENIED.

The instant motion appears to rely on the summary procedures for settlement enforcement prescribed by Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6, which are not available in an action other than the one in which the subject settlement was reached. (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6; see, e.g., Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200.) Further, the law disapproves of this type of “non-statutory speaking motion” in this context; the proper vehicle for Plaintiff’s efforts herein appears to be a motion for summary judgment, which must meet the requirements set forth in Code Civ. Proc. § 437c. (See, e.g. Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 992.)

Moreover, while the Court has not reviewed the evidence in detail due to the above procedural issues, it appears that the parties dispute the underlying facts regarding their required performance under the subject agreement.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge David I. Hood in Department 24:

CV-21-001167 – ELIZONDO, AARON vs KCB VENTURES INC – Defendant, Tejinderpaul Chahal’s Motion for Good Faith Determination – GRANTED, unopposed. 

The request for judicial notice of the Second Amended Complaint is GRANTED as to the existence and contents of the court record, but not as to the truth of disputed allegations. (Evidence Code section 452)

Applying the factors stated in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, the Court finds that the $375,000 settlement between plaintiff Aaron Elizondo and settling parties Tejinderpaul Chahal, Harmesh Chahal, and Vicky David dba Vault 9 Nail Supply and Boutique is within the reasonable range of the settling parties’ potential proportionate liability.

The settlement amount is substantial in relation to the damages evidence presented, liability and comparative fault are disputed, and there is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed at the non-settling defendants. No opposition has been filed.   

The settlement is therefore determined to have been made in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6. Pursuant to section 877.6, subdivision (c), all claims against the settling party for equitable comparative contribution or partial or comparative indemnity based on comparative negligence or comparative fault are barred.

CV-24-010203 – OVIEDO TRANSPORT LLC vs CALIFORNIA TRUCK CENTERS LLC – Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Cross Complaint – GRANTED, unopposed.

The Court finds that the cause of action for breach of contract alleged in the proposed cross-complaint is related to the causes of action asserted against defendant in the complaint, that defendant acted in good faith in not pleading the cause of action when defendant filed his answer to the complaint, and that leave should be granted in order to avoid forfeiture of the cause of action. (California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 426.50, 428.10).

Defendant Keyes Truck Center is accordingly hereby granted leave to file its cross-complaint herein.

Said cross-complaint shall be filed within seven (7) days of the date of this order.

CV-25-009803 – DOLZADELLI, CHELSEA vs SALAS, OSCAR – a) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Form Interrogatories – MOOT; b) Defendant’s Motion to Deem Admissions – MOOT.

a) MOOT.

The Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff’s late filed Opposition hereto. Jack v. Ring LLC, (2023); 91 Cal. App. 5th 1186; Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc., (2010)186 Cal. App. 4th 755.

Defendant is entitled to Code compliant verified responses to its Form Interrogatories, Set Two served on Plaintiff on July 17, 2026. Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260

However, in light of Plaintiff’s verified responses and amended verified responses served on Defendant ahead of this hearing, and Plaintiff’s Counsel’s attestations to the calendaring mistake that led to said untimely responses, Plaintiff is relieved from the waiver of objections caused by said untimely responses.

However, monetary sanctions are imposed against Plaintiff and her Counsel of record in the sum of $375 for Defendant’s Counsel’s reasonable fees and costs incurred in filing and prosecuting this motion.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is denied.

b) MOOT.

The Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff’s late filed Opposition hereto. (Jack v. Ring LLC, (2023); 91 Cal. App. 5th 1186; Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc., (2010)186 Cal. App. 4th 755).

In view of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s declaration as to the service of Plaintiff’s Responses and Amended Responses to said Request for Admissions, Set One, prior to the hearing on this motion, which the Court deems substantially compliant, the Court finds this motion, moot. Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.280 (b) and (c)

However, monetary sanctions of $525 are imposed against Plaintiff’ and her Counsel for Defendant’s Counsel’s reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in filing this motion Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is denied.

CV-26-001921 – JOHNSON, GUY PATRICK vs COUNTY OF STANISLAUS – a) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint - CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion; b) Defendant California Forensic Medical Group, Inc.’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

a) CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The Court notes that Defendants failed to engage in the required meet and confer prior to bringing the Motion to Strike. Regardless of Defendants’ prior meet and confer, meet and confer was required after the filing of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. “If an amended pleading is filed, the responding party shall meet and confer again with the party who filed the amended pleading before filing a motion to strike the amended pleading.” Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).

Therefore, the parties are ordered to engage in meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference” to address and or narrow down the issues raised by the present motion to strike. Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a).

The hearing on the motion is accordingly continued to November 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court for that purpose.

No later than five court days ahead of the continued hearing the parties shall file a Joint Statement, or individual statements if a joint statement cannot be filed, advising the Court of the status of the Motion to Strike, and of outstanding issues, if any.

b) CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.

The parties are ordered to engage in meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference” to address and or narrow down the issues raised by the Demurrer.

The hearing on the motion is accordingly continued to November 5, 2026, at 8:30 am in Department 24 of this Court for that purpose.

No later than five court days ahead of the continued hearing the parties shall file a Joint Statement, or individual statements if a joint statement cannot be filed, advising the Court of the status of the Demurrer, and of outstanding issues, if any.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Richard Moths in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-25-001028 – US BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION vs BOWERS, LATONA R – Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Answer – HEARING REQUIRED.