Family Law Tentative Rulings
Family Law Tentative Ruling Announcements
The family court issues tentative ruling announcements on the court day prior to the scheduled hearing for specific types of motions. Tentative rulings are only provided on the Internet and posted in the clerk’s office lobby. Internet postings occur at 3:30 p.m. daily.
Parties are not required to give notice of intent to appear to preserve the right to a hearing. The tentative ruling will not become final until the hearing. (Stan. Cnty. Local Rules, rule 7.05.1) However, as a courtesy to the Court, and other parties or counsel with matters on calendar, notice of intended appearance or non-appearance is encouraged and may be sent by e-mail to the following address: familylaw.tentatives@stanct.org between the hours of 1:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. If you do not receive a confirmation e-mail from the clerk, you may call to speak directly with a Calendar Clerk at 209-530-3107.
Any party filing pleadings or documents on a tentative ruling matter within five (5) days of the hearing should provide a courtesy copy to the Courtroom Clerk and the Court’s Family Law Research Attorney by placing a copy in the drop box slot on the door of Room 223, Second Floor of the main Courthouse. Failure to do so may prevent the Court from consideration of such, may result in a continuance, and/or may be considered in the award of conduct-based fees and costs. (Stan. Cnty. Local Rules, rule 7.05.1(B).)
All parties and counsel are required to meet and confer in a good faith effort to resolve the dispute on any request, motion or hearing, with the exception of those involving domestic violence, and to exchange any documents upon which reliance will be made at the hearing. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.98; Stan. Cnty. Local Rules, rule 7.05.1(C).) Failure to do so may result in a continuance and may be considered in the award of conduct-based fees and costs, or both. If sufficient information regarding an adequate pre-hearing meet and confer effort is not provided in the moving and opposing papers, in the Court’s discretion, the matter may be placed at the end of the calendar and not called until the parties or counsel advise the Court that they have complied with their obligations and/or resolved the matters own motion, the Court orders Respondent to comply within thirty (30) days of this ruling and admonishes Respondent that the failure to do so may result in the striking of the Response and entry of Respondent’s default.
As both threshold findings are required, this obviates the need to consider the second finding but, for future reference should the matter ever be renewed, the Court offers the following observations gleaned from the caselaw. The question of “sufficient means” is to be determined not by any marital standard of living test, as with spousal support, nor by any accustomed financial circumstances consistent with the child’s best interests within the parties’ ability to pay standard as with support of minor children, but rather by the likelihood that without court-ordered support the adult child will become a public charge. (Marriage of Drake, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1154.)
Lastly, it is important to note that, even if court-ordered adult child support is found to be necessary and appropriate, any payments ordered do not necessarily go to the party currently having physical custody of the adult child, but may in the Court’s discretion be ordered payable to a “special needs trust” or, in appropriate cases, to a conservator, guardian or legal representative of the adult child. It should therefore not be presumed that any money Respondent is ordered to pay for adult child support will be paid to Petitioner. Moreover, to the extent that Respondent is ordered to pay temporary spousal support and/or attorney’s fees and costs, those payments must be factored into any determination of Respondent’s ability to pay, along with a determination of Petitioner’s own ability to pay (or offsetting credit) of her co-equal duty to pay whatever amount is set for adult child support. (See, Hogoboom & King, Cal. Prac. Guide Family L. (TRG 2026) Ch. 6-A, § 6:56-6:57.)
In short, the Court is inclined to deny the request for adult child support without prejudice but, as noted infra, the Court’s statutory jurisdiction over the issue is reserved and may not be terminated as a matter of law.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge Alan Cassidy in Department #11:
THERE ARE NO TENTATIVES.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge J. Richard Distaso in Department #13:
FL-25-001790 – RODRIQUEZ VS RODRIQUEZ
Petitioner’s Request for Order re “Genetic Testing,” etc.—DENIED.
There is no proof of service on file as required. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.94(b).) Although Respondent is in default, the paternity of the minor children of the marriage is a question that involves due process rights and both adequate notice and service are required in the Court’s view. But even if Respondent were to appear and waive service, Petitioner’s request is untimely and fails to allege, let alone prove, sufficient facts to entitle Petitioner to court-ordered genetic tests.
Petitioner filed the Petition for Dissolution on July 7, 2025, and listed four minors as children of the parties’ marriage. The subject minor’s date of birth was alleged to be October 12, 2023, which is after the date of marriage and less than seven (7) months after the date of separation. As noted, Respondent’s default was entered on June 4, 2026, at Petitioner’s request. Those allegations, now that Respondent’s default has been entered, are deemed admitted and constitute judicial admissions. As a matter of law, the child of spouses who cohabitated at the time of conception is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage. (Fam. Code, § 7540(a); County of Los Angeles v. Christopher W. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 827, 837.) Petitioner’s only allegation to rebut this “conclusive” presumption is that Respondent has refused to provide a birth certificate for the subject minor and that Petitioner suspects the minor child was “conceived around the time of infidelity.”
Neither allegation, even if found true by the Court, precludes the existence of the predicate foundational facts for application of the so-called conclusive marital presumption. (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 587 [7540 presumption applied even though H’s military service entailed deployment out of state where evidence demonstrated that H and W lived together in military housing when child was conceived].) In addition, genetic tests have no legal significance and are inadmissible to rebut the 7540 presumption unless those tests are ordered by the Court and performed by court-appointed experts pursuant to law. (Fam. Code, §§ 7541(a), 7551(a),(b)(2), 7552; Miller v. Miller (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 111, 119.) Lastly, an action or proceeding to rebut parentage established by the 7540 presumption must be commenced within two (2) years of the minor child’s date of birth, which means that the pleading must be both filed and served within that time. (Fam. Code, § 7541(b); Marriage of Freeman (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1444; Miller, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at 119.) As of this date, Petitioner has not served his paternity challenge and request for genetic testing and the last day to do so expired on October 13, 2025. Petitioner’s request is denied.
88382 – QUIROZ VS LANDEROS
Petitioner’s Request for Order re “Set Aside Parentage,” etc.—DENIED.
There is no proof of service on file and the matter is post-judgment, so proper and timely individual party service is jurisdictional. (Fam. Code, § 215(a); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.94(b).)
However, even if Respondent were to appear and waive this defect, this action has been terminated and the matter finally adjudicated since at least 2002, over twenty years before Petitioner’s current order request. No authority exists that would authorize the Court to grant Petitioner’s request at this late date aside from proof of extrinsic fraud and the Court’s authority to set aside orders and judgments that are void. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(d).) Petitioner’s allegation that Respondent’s former counsel of record made assertions inconsistent with Petitioner’s paternity in a brief filed before a long-cause hearing or trial in 1997 is not evidence of anything, since the argument of counsel is by definition not “evidence,” and the Court’s predecessors’ decisions, findings, or other rulings speak for themselves. Moreover, at best, this would constitute “intrinsic,” rather than extrinsic, fraud and would fail to provide legal grounds to set aside a final judgment as void under section 473(d).
More importantly, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the judgment for the same grounds re-asserted here that was heard and denied by Judge Silveira, retired, on November 26, 2002, who ruled as follows: “Pet. notice of motion to vacate judgment is DENIED. Paternity has been legally determined by judgment filed 4-30-97.” (Minute Order, 11/26/2002, p. 1 – Index No. 36 from physical case file, emphasis added, all-caps original.) Petitioner may not seek renewal or reconsideration of previously made requests without establishing by affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury that there are new or different facts, circumstances or changes of law that justify revisiting and overturning final rulings, orders or judgments and must further demonstrate that Petitioner could not have discovered or offered these new or different matters had he exercised reasonable diligence to obtain them in time to be presented at the original hearing or trial in the first place. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a), (b).) Petitioner failed to do so here. Petitioner’s remaining asserted reasons for this request are unpersuasive: first, any relationship, whether approved of by Petitioner or not, between the subject child and Petitioner’s parents would seem to be their concern, and none of Petitioner’s or this Court’s; second, the same is true for Petitioner’s new wife and any adult children, who are not parties to this case and over whom the Court has no jurisdiction; lastly, whether the subject child is or is not entitled to be a beneficiary of Petitioner’s estate is a question for a Probate attorney and not this Court, which may not provide legal advice as a neutral, or else for another Division of this Court in the event of Petitioner’s unfortunate demise.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge Sarah Birmingham in Department #14:
FL-23-003132 – ALESNA VS ALESNA
Petitioner’s Request for Order re “Clarify,” etc.—HEARING REQUIRED.
Proof of mail service on Respondent is on file, but this matter is now post-judgment as of November 4, 2025, and all post-judgment order requests must be individually served on the opposing party. In the case of service by mail, the means that the opposing party’s mailing address must be confirmed as current. (Fam. Code, § 215(a); Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.92(f)(2)(B) [Address verification by form FL-334 or equivalent required by section 215].) Petitioner did not file a form FL-334 and Petitioner’s declaration does not otherwise verify the continuing validity of Respondent’s mailing address. Respondent did not file a Responsive Declaration or other opposition and before the Court considers the merits of Petitioner’s order request, the Court must find that compliance with section 215 has occurred, as that statute is “jurisdictional.”
Aside from this, there is no such thing as a “motion to clarify” a final judgment. Once the time for appeal and challenge has expired, the Court’s only role with respect to a final judgment relating to property or support is to enforce the judgment “as-is.” The Court may not amend, modify, or rewrite the terms of a final judgment based on subsequent developments or the parties’ course of conduct or representations to each other about the terms and consequences of the final judgment. (Marriage of Thorne & Raccina (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 492, 499 [once judgment becomes final, court generally loses jurisdiction to modify or alter it]; Marriage of Farrell (1985) 171 CA3d 695, 702 [“Any other rule of law would reduce finality of decision in dissolution cases to an illusion”]; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Prac. Guide Family L. (TRG 2026) Ch. 17-E, § 17:340.)
The provision for an equalization payment by Respondent is already an “order” that Respondent is obligated to follow and any further order would be redundant and is unnecessary. The Court must remain neutral and may not give either party legal advice, but it is a matter of law that orders regarding money or property in a final judgment are tantamount to “money judgments” for purposes of the Enforcement of Judgments Act and may be enforced or collected using any of the means provided by that Act. Petitioner may wish to seek legal advice at her own expense but is also welcome to contact the Court’s Self-Help Center for free assistance with legal forms and procedures that do not require providing legal advice.
The following are the tentative ruling cases calendared before Judge Maria Elena Ramos-Ratliff in Department #25:
FL-26-000859 – GONZALEZ VS MONTIEL
Respondent’s Request for Order re Set Aside, etc.—HEARING REQUIRED.
Proof of mail service on Petitioner’s counsel of record at the time is on file and presumptively valid. However, Petitioner filed a Substitution of Attorney on July 22, 2026, and is now self-represented. No Responsive Declaration or other opposition has been filed and the Court wishes to inquire as to whether Petitioner has received actual notice and whether Petitioner opposes Respondent’s order request before ruling on the merits.
Turning to said merits, Respondent seeks to set aside the Court’s Findings and Order After Hearing (FOAH) of April 28, 2026, which resulted from Petitioner’s Request for Order re Child Custody and Visitation. The Court granted Petitioner’s request for an Order Shortening Time (OST) and, based on Petitioner’s moving papers, granted temporary emergency orders pending hearing. The matter was originally set for mediation on April 21, 2026, but was continued by the Court to April 28, 2026, due to the mediator’s lack of sufficient time to hear it as set. (FOAH, 4/21/26, p. 2 of 3.) Respondent made no appearance at either the hearing as originally set, nor the continued hearing. The subject FOAH expressly states:
The following custody and visitation orders are imposed by the Court based upon the combined agreement of the party and recommendation of the child custody counselor in the absence of the Mother and without prejudice. This order shall supersede all prior orders. (FOAH, 4/28/26, p. 2 of 3, emphasis added.)
Respondent’s order request attaches a Points and Authorities, but there is no declaration signed by Respondent herself. Counsel’s representations as to the alleged facts serving as the basis for relief are merely “argument,” not “evidence” upon which the Court may rely. (See, Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.111(b)(2) [“A declaration must be based on personal knowledge and explain how the person has acquired that knowledge”], emphasis added.) Factual declarations are compulsory per the Rules of Court and per the “mandatory” nature of the Judicial Council FL-300 form required for all order requests. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 5.92(b)(1); Marriage of Bardzik (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1297, n. 3 [declarations are supposed to reflect statements of the declarant under oath, not legal argument by counsel]; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Prac. Guide Family L. (TRG 2026) Ch. 5-D, § 5:325-327 [“Evidentiary facts in support of each requested order must be included…The supporting declarations are for factual allegations”].) Absent such evidence, the Court is inclined to deny the request.
In any event, the authority cited by Respondent’s counsel is inapposite:
First, Family Code section 3690 et seq. only governs set aside of support orders, none of which are at issue here.
Second, Family Code section 2100 et seq. applies only to judgments adjudicating support or division of property, and only after the expiration of the time for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. (See, Fam. Code, § 2121(a) [“In proceedings for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal separation of the parties, the court may, on any terms that may be just, relieve a spouse from a judgment, or any part or parts thereof, adjudicating support or division of property, after the six-month time limit of Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure has run…”], emphasis added.) Moreover, this is an action to establish parental relations, and therefore not a proceeding within the express scope of section 2100 et seq.
Third, and last, Respondent’s counsel cites section 473(b) as authority but counsel did not submit an “affidavit of fault” that the subject FOAH resulted from counsel’s neglect or mistake such that the so-called “mandatory” relief provisions of section 473(b) apply, nor did Respondent herself submit any affidavit attesting to facts that would establish “mistake, surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect” sufficient to warrant relief. Even if Respondent had, the subject FOAH concerns neither a “default” nor a “dismissal,” and because Petitioner’s original RFO sought pendente lite relief, there is no “judgment” or even permanent custody order at issue, and any analogy to default is misplaced since that would assume the subject FOAH was not founded on the minor child’s best interests, but was instead based solely on Respondent’s absence. No authority is offered that 473(b) relief obtains for temporary and pendente lite orders, and the prevailing view is to the contrary. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Capos (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 997, 1007 [distinguishing cases granting relief under Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473(b),(d), 580, where default or default judgments were at issue because the appellant’s default had not been taken]; Hogoboom & King, supra, at § 5:300.8 [“[M]ore recent cases hold that the provision for mandatory relief does not apply absent an actual default, default judgment or dismissal. This is probably the better view...”].) Indeed, all child custody matters are inherently modifiable until the age of majority and because the Court expressly noted in the subject FOAH that it was “without prejudice” due to Respondent’s non-appearance, set aside is arguably unnecessary for Respondent to seek modification. In terms of section 473(b) procedure, Respondent’s order request did not include a copy of the “answer or other pleading proposed to be filed” (in this case a Responsive Declaration or FL-320), absent which “the application shall not be granted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b), emphasis added.)
Based on the preceding, the Court is inclined to deny Respondent’s order request, but as with the subject FOAH, will do so without prejudice to future modification proceedings.