Amended June 12, 2025

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

CV-24-010035 – VALDEZ, JAQUELINE vs ALGHAZZI, WISSAM ALI – Defendant Lendbuzz Funding, LLC’s Verified Application to Appear as Counsel Pro Hac Vice – GRANTED.

The Court will sign the proposed order.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-23-002593 – MILLER ARMS COMPANY INC vs CITY OF RIVERBANK – a) Defendant City of Riverbank’s Motion to Compel Reponses from Miller Arms Company, Inc. to Form Interrogatories, Set One – DENIED; b) Defendant City of Riverbank’s Motion to Compel Responses from Miller Arms Company, Inc. to Special Interrogatories, Set One –GRANTED.

a) Form Interrogatories

Defendant City of Riverbank’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories is DENIED. The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition meritorious. Form Interrogatory Nos. 8.2-8.8 are not suited to the context of the current case. Plaintiff is a corporation and does not have a job title or date employment began or a monthly income, etc. There is no applicable return to work date or dates when Plaintiff “did not work.”

 

Moving Defendant contends that because Plaintiff answered Form Interrogatory No. 8.1, it had to answer Nos. 8.2 to 8.8. The Court disagrees (and notes that perhaps Plaintiff should have also answered No. 8.1 by stating, “No,” or, “Not applicable.”) As Plaintiff explained in its opposition (and as it already clarified to Defendants), “Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for anticipatory breach of contract resulting from Defendants’ wrongful refusal to transfer ownership of said equipment. Plaintiff is seeking contractual damages and recovery of funds expended to remediate equipment, not recovery of ‘lost income.’ ” (Opp., at p. 7.)

Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(d), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for sanctions in the amount of $1,500 against Defendant City of Riverbank. The sanctions are to be paid directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Law Offices of Brunn & Flynn.

b) Special Interrogatories

Defendant City of Riverbank’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories is GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to provide further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 13-16 and 33 within 10 days of notice of entry of the order.

In particular, Moving Defendant’s arguments regarding lack of detail are well-taken. To the extent Plaintiff’s answers reference customers, contracts, or documents, details must be provided, and document references must be specific. To the extent Plaintiff is claiming attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the scope of the claims must be delineated, and if the answer implicates privileged or protected documents, then Plaintiff needs to provide a privilege log or provide enough information for the opposing party and the Court to make a determination regarding the validity of the claim. For Special Interrogatory No. 33, Plaintiff needs to describe the procedures it undertook that it contends were necessary to meet TSCA standards, and it needs to specifically describe the documents it is referencing, not just generally reference the document production as a whole.

Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(d), Moving Defendant seeks $2,889 in sanctions against Plaintiff and/or its counsel. The Court finds the fee request excessive and GRANTS sanctions in the reduced amount of $1,500 against Plaintiff Miller Arms Company Inc. The sanctions are to be paid directly to Defendant’s counsel, White Brenner LLP.

Order

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion, except the requirement that the sanctions be paid “no later than fifteen (15) days following notice of entry of this order” is stricken. Orders granting monetary sanctions are enforceable as judgments; a timeline for payment is an unnecessary addition. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995) [“A monetary sanction is immediately enforceable as a judgment, unless the court rules that it is not.”].)

CV-23-004578 – ADVANCED MATERIALS AND MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES LLC vs CITY OF RIVERBANK – a) Defendant City of Modesto’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies, LLC’ Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Request for Sanctions – DENIED; b) Defendant City of Riverbank’s Motion to Compel Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies, LLC’s Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One; Request for Sanctions – GRANTED.

a) Form Interrogatories

Defendant City of Riverbank’s motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories is DENIED. The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition meritorious. Form Interrogatory Nos. 8.2-8.8 are not suited to the context of the current case. Plaintiff is a limited liability company and does not have a job title or date employment began or a monthly income, etc. There is no applicable return to work date or dates when Plaintiff “did not work.”

 

Moving Defendant contends that because Plaintiff answered Form Interrogatory No. 8.1, it had to answer Nos. 8.2 to 8.8. The Court disagrees (and notes that perhaps Plaintiff should have also answered No. 8.1 by stating, “No,” or, “Not applicable.”) As Plaintiff explained in its opposition (and as it already clarified to Defendants), “Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for anticipatory breach of contract resulting from Defendants’ wrongful refusal to transfer ownership of said equipment. Plaintiff is seeking contractual damages and recovery of funds expended to remediate equipment, not recovery of ‘lost income.’ ” (Opp., at p. 7.)

Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(d), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for sanctions in the amount of $1,500 against Defendant City of Riverbank. The sanctions are to be paid directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, Law Offices of Brunn & Flynn.

b) Special Interrogatories

Defendant City of Riverbank’s motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories is GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to provide further responses to Special Interrogatory No. 33 within 10 days of notice of entry of the order.

In particular, Moving Defendant’s arguments regarding lack of detail are well-taken. Plaintiff needs to describe the procedures it undertook that it contends were necessary to meet TSCA standards, and it needs to specifically describe the documents it is referencing, not just generally reference the document production as a whole.

Sanctions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(d), Moving Defendant seeks $2,889 in sanctions against Plaintiff and/or its counsel. The Court finds the fee request excessive and GRANTS sanctions in the reduced amount of $1,500 against Plaintiff Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies LLC. The sanctions are to be paid directly to Defendant’s counsel, White Brenner LLP.

Order

The Court will sign the proposed order that was submitted with the motion, except the requirement that the sanctions be paid “no later than fifteen (15) days following notice of entry of this order” is stricken. Orders granting monetary sanctions are enforceable as judgments; a timeline for payment is an unnecessary addition. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 610, as modified (Dec. 6, 1995) [“A monetary sanction is immediately enforceable as a judgment, unless the court rules that it is not.”].)

CV-24-008419 – GUTIERREZ, ROBERTO vs NINO, ARTURO – Plaintiff’s Motion for a Judgment on the Pleadings Per CCP 438 – DENIED.

Plaintiffs have moved for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds “that the Defendant's Verified Answer admits the material allegations in the Complaint (¶¶ 1-8), and Defendant raises no legally sufficient affirmative defenses.” (4/17/25 Mot., at p. 2.) (Note: In fact, neither the complaint nor the answer is verified.)

In his answer, Defendant admits the foundational allegations regarding parties, venue, and jurisdiction. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1-5.) He then admits paragraphs 6-8 in the “Factual Allegations” section, which are simply background. He essentially denies paragraph 9, which alleges that Defendant failed to pay off the underlying note, failed to obtain a reconveyance, and failed to record a reconveyance.

Defendant neither admits nor denies paragraphs 10-13 due to lack of knowledge.

A defendant is permitted to answer that he neither admits nor denies an allegation where he truly has insufficient knowledge to respond to the allegations of the complaint. Conversely, “if the matter is within the defendant's actual knowledge or by its nature is presumed to be within his knowledge, or if the defendant has the means of ascertaining whether or not it is true, a denial on information and belief or for lack of either will be deemed sham and evasive and may be stricken out or disregarded.” (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791.)

Defendant should likely have either admitted or denied paragraphs 10-12, and thus they may be treated as admitted. Paragraph 13 is a different matter. The allegations set forth therein appear to be exclusively within Plaintiffs’ knowledge, not Defendant’s.

Moreover, Defendant directly disputes the allegation in paragraph 14 that he failed to fulfill his contractual obligations.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that Defendant has not pleaded any affirmative defenses. (See Mem., at p. 8 ¶ 22.) He has, albeit not in a traditional format. His affirmative defenses include that whatever lapse in payment occurred was the fault of third parties, not his, and that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.

It is noted that there is indeed something odd with the timeline in Plaintiffs’ pleading. The contractual obligations at issue were undertaken in 2001. Plaintiffs allege that they paid off the loan in 2004. And yet it was not until 2024 that a Notice of Default and a Notice of Trustee’s Sale were recorded? And Plaintiffs did not know until 2024 that the property had never been conveyed to them? The complaint’s narrative has information gaps that warrant further explanation.

Consequently, the Court cannot say that “the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(c)(1)(A).) The motion is thus DENIED.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request to take judicial notice of the answer and complaint filed in this case pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:

CV-24-000134 – ZAMORA, EBERARDO vs LAZCANO, MANUEL – Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend – GRANTED.

The Court has broad discretion in this area, and discretion is usually exercised liberally to permit amendment. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.)

CV-24-002704 – TAMEZ, MARIA LYDIA vs LONGORIA, CESAR – a) Defendants and Cross- Complainants Cesar and Adrian Longoria’s Motion for Evidentiary and/or Terminating Sanctions, and for Monetary Sanctions, Against Plaintiff Tamez for Failure to Comply with Court’s January 30, 2025 Discovery Order – GRANTED, as to evidentiary sanctions, and unopposed; b) Defendants and Cross- Complainants Cesar and Adrian Longoria’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions and/or Evidentiary Sanctions, and for Monetary Sanctions, Against Plaintiff Ornelas for Failure to Comply with the Court’s January 30,2025 and February 7, 2025 Discovery Orders – GRANTED, as to terminating sanctions, and unopposed.

a) The Court grants evidentiary sanctions as set forth in the Notice of Motion, page 2, line 7 through page 4, line 20. The request for economic sanctions is DENIED.

b) The Court issues an order striking Plaintiff Ornelas’ Verified Complaint filed 4/8/2024, and an order striking Plaintiff Ornelas’ Verified Answer (filed 7/1/2024) to the Cross-Complaint. The request for economic sanctions is DENIED.

CV-25-000643 – TORRES, DANIEL MARTINEZ vs JOES TRAVEL PLAZA – Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Default – GRANTED, and unopposed.

Defendant has demonstrated entitlement to relief pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b) and shall have 30 days in which to file a response to the Complaint.  In addition, the parties are instructed to meet and confer further with regard to any anticipated challenge via demurrer or motion to strike prior to submission of Defendant’s responsive pleading.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-24-007263 – HERNANDEZ, DANIEL EZEQUIEL vs BRAKE PARTS LLC – Defendant Brake Parts LLC’s Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of Related Class Action – MOOT.

Given Plaintiff’s withdrawal of his class action claims herein, Defendant’s motion is now moot.

Relatedly, Plaintiff’s pending Motions to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories and Requests for Productions which relate to said class action claims are accordingly vacated.

CV-24-009962 – THE AGRI GROUP INC vs LEAVITT, BURNS D – Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice Request for Immediate Payment of Outstanding Debt Request for Continuance of CMC – DENIED.

The Court finds that service of Plaintiff’s Summons and Complaint complies with statute. (Civ. Proc. Code §§ 415.40 and 583.210, (a).; In re Marriage of Tusinger (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 80). 

The Court also finds given the allegations that the agreement between the parties was entered into in Stanislaus County, California, the product at issue was delivered and consumed in Stanislaus County, and the breach also occurred in Stanislaus County that sufficient contacts exist between Defendant and this forum to establish this Court’s jurisdiction over Defendant. (Van Buskirk v. Van Buskirk, (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 523 as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 9, 2020); (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff, (2016)1 Cal. App. 5th 198).   For similar reasons, venue for this action is proper in this forum. (Civ. Proc. Code § 395 (a)).

The Court further finds that even if it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant, given Defendant’s request to the Court to address the merits of the dispute, Defendant is participating in this action in a manner that recognizes the Court’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, said request by Defendant amounts to a relinquishment of all objections based on lack of personal jurisdiction or defective process or service of process herein.  (Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607; ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff, (2016)1 Cal. App. 5th 198).

Defendant’s compilation of all his claims in one motion is not helpful to the Court as some of Defendant’s claims would be better suited for Motions to Compel Arbitration, or for Summary Judgement.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is hereby denied.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***