Civil Tentative Rulings Announcement
CIVIL TENTATIVE RULING ANNOUNCEMENT
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February 11, 2025
The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:
CV-23-004682 – DUARTE, EILEEN M vs NELSON, IRENE M – Plaintiff’s Motion to Modify Defendant’s Deposition Subpoena to US Bank – GRANTED.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to modify the deposition subpoena. US Bank shall produce records only through Joe A. Duarte’s date of death.
The Cross-Complainants’ justifications for seeking records beyond that date are unpersuasive.
Monetary sanctions for a motion to quash or modify a subpoena are discretionary. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2.) Plaintiff did not request any sanctions in conjunction with her motion, so no sanctions are awarded.
The Court reminds the parties that rule 3.1110(f)(4) of the California Rules of Court requires electronic exhibits for law and motion practice to be bookmarked if the document is submitted by an attorney.
Plaintiff to provide a proposed order within five court days that comports with this ruling.
CV-24-007477 – SLIGAR, CHRISTOPHER vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA – Defendant’s Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration – GRANTED
The Court, on its own motion, strikes the Declaration of Ali Ameripour filed on January 28, 2025, as to the state cases. The Court is not permitted to consider trial court rulings under Rule of Court 8.1115. The Court has a duty of independence under the judicial canons. (See also TBG Ins. Service Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 447 n.2.) The Court anticipates this educational note will be effective, and the Court will not need to point to this ruling in the future.
The Court considers the federal cases cited as persuasive, but see below.
Objections
Plaintiffs have objected to Defendant’s submission of Exhibit 3, a copy of the 2020 Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information, and the statement in the supporting declaration regarding Exhibit 3. The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs’ Objection Nos. 1-2 based on lack of personal knowledge. However, the Owner’s Manual is still admissible for the reasons outlined below.
Requests for Judicial Notice
In conjunction with the moving papers, Defendant filed a request for judicial notice asking the Court to take judicial notice of the complaint in the instant case. The Court need not make such a ruling to consider papers in the instant case. (See Bienville Water Supply v. Mobile (1902) 22 S.Ct. 820.)
As for Plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice, the Court GRANTS those unopposed requests pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453.
General Legal Standards for Arbitration Agreements
The Defendant contends that the FAA applies, whereas Plaintiffs argue the CAA applies. Under both federal and state law, it is the Court's responsibility to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. (See 9 U.S.C. § 4 [“If the making of the arbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 [If the court “determines that [a written] agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists … [it may order enforcement].”].)
State law applicable to contracts generally governs whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492; Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc. (6th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 343, 347; Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 [“Federal policy in favor of arbitration does not come into play … until a court has found the parties entered into a valid contract under state law.”].)
Once the existence of the agreement is established, the burden of establishing grounds that prevent its enforcement is on the plaintiffs as the challenging parties (Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153-1154). There is no blanket ban on arbitration of Song-Beverly actions. (See Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486.)
Owners’ Manual Arbitration Provision
Despite the objection, the owner’s manual appears admissible under Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218–219.
Both Plaintiffs have submitted declarations stating that they did not review the manual and were unaware of the arbitration clause contained therein until this motion was filed. (See 1/22/25 Decl. of C. Sligar ¶¶ 4-5; 1/22/25 Decl. of K. Sligar ¶¶ 4-5.) Defendant argues that the warranty is in the owner’s manual and therefore binding upon Plaintiffs. But Plaintiffs did not agree to it. Defendant’s argument is essentially that because the clause was included in the warranty, reliance on the warranty immediately triggers the clause.
The imposition of duties on a buyer to make a warranty claim appears unsound. (See Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications America LLC (9th. Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d. 1279.) Defendant’s estoppel argument fails as there is no evidence the Plaintiffs were aware of the clause and Plaintiffs assert they purchased the car with a representation of a written warranty.
The Court therefore rules that no agreement to arbitrate was made based on the purchase of the vehicle and owner’s manual.
Defendant cites to two federal district court cases finding the warranty as written enforceable, Guaschino v. Hyundai (Central District of California 8:22-cv-01526-FWS-JDE) and Mendoza v. Hyundai (Central District of California case CV 22-21-DMG-AFMx). The Court is not persuaded.
Further, Defendant had an obligation to cite to a third case, that of Hageman v. Hyundai (2024 WL 5285191) which retains its persuasive value though currently being appealed. Hageman appears not to have involved the defense law firm involved in this case, so they may not have been aware of it but are now.
Bluelink "Connected Services Agreement"
There is a second arbitration provision contained in the Bluelink Connected Services Agreement.
The Court therefore finds that an agreement to arbitrate was made. The terms and conditions of the Bluelink agreement are over 20 pages in tiny type.
Plaintiff’s argument that the provision by its own terms does not apply to non-Bluelink issues is unsound. The language clearly references disputes over the vehicle.
In citing to federal cases as persuasive authority, Defendant should have also cited to Hageman v. Hyundai Motor America (2024) WL 5285191, which found adversely to Hyundai in a similar case. This case was not handled by the defense firm involved in this case, but if they were not on notice, they are now. While this case has been appealed to the 9th Circuit, the matter remains persuasive authority. But the Court is not persuaded by the argument that the plain meaning of the words including “your vehicle” ought not be given credence.
Unconscionability
Unconscionability has two factors, which the Court must weigh, procedural and substantive unconscionability. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Company, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899; Armenderiz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal 4th 83, 114.)
The use of the Bluelink approval has high procedural unconscionability – use of a feature of the car requires assent to a very lengthy contract with terms. Any arbitration issues, and especially arbitration issues as to issues unrelated to Bluelink, would naturally come as a surprise to the purchaser.
Thus, the substantive unconscionability need not be high to reach a conclusion that it is unconscionable.
But Plaintiffs’ arguments that there is any substantive unconscionability fail. They argue:
- They lose the right to a jury trial. But this is simply the result of any arbitration.
- They lose the non-waiver clause which they are entitled to, an argument the Court rejects above.
- They lose certain discovery right, which is the nature of arbitration.
- Arbitrations go poorly for conscumers.
None of these are the sort of substantive unconscionability which the case law endorses as having a remedy.
Given the substantial degree of procedural unconscionability in the Bluelink agreement, even a small degree of substantive unconscionability would carry the day for the opposition. But here, I find none of the assertions by Plaintiff meet the requirements of the case law.
While there are suggestions in some case law that procedural unconscionability alone might at some point meet the requirement without substantive unconscionability, the trial court is bound by the rulings of the appellate courts. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450.)
CV-24-010035 – VALDEZ, JAQUELINE vs ALGHAZZI, WISSAM ALI – Defendant Wissam Ali Alghazzi’s Motion to Seal – HEARING REQUIRED.
The Court understands the importance of sealing Plaintiff’s bank account information and would like to help the parties accomplish that goal in an efficient manner. But there are some procedural issues with this motion.
The Court needs Plaintiff to appear and waive the defect in service, as the motion was untimely served only 17 court days before the hearing. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1005(b), 1013(a).) In addition, the Moving Party has not provided the Court with a redacted version of the answer that can be publicly filed in place of the sealed answer.
The Court will discuss with the parties the best way to proceed.
The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:
CV-23-000116 – NASSER, AMIN MOHAMMED vs KHAN, AURANGZEB – a) Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel as to Aurangzeb Khan – GRANTED, and unopposed; b) Defendant’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel as to Yasmeen Khan – GRANTED, and unopposed.
a) – b)
The Court GRANTS the unopposed motions by Attorney Gerald E. Brunn of the Law Offices of Brunn & Flynn to be relieved as counsel for Defendants Aurangzeb Khan and Yasmeen Khan, effective on the filing of a proof showing service of the signed order on the respective clients.
The Court will sign the proposed orders that were submitted with the motions.
The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Judge John D. Freeland in Department 23:
CV-24-004228 – NARANJO, MARIO JR vs FCA US LLC – a) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories from Defendant FCA US LLC, and Request for Sanctions; b) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production from Defendant FCA US LLC, and Request for Sanctions –
(a), (b) The motions are DENIED, as MOOT in view of Defendant’s service of verified supplemental responses. In addition, it appears to the Court that the motions were filed prematurely, without conducting sufficient meet-and-confer efforts. The Court declines to award sanctions.
The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:
CV-23-000842 – LEMKE, TERRA vs GONZALES, JULIO MIGUEL – a) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Gonzales to Further Respond to Form Interrogatory Nos. 4.1 and 4.2; Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Gonzales to Further Respond to Special Interrogatory Nos. 11.24 and 26; Request for Sanctions – CONTINUED.
a) Based on indications by Defendants that the parties are in the process of finalizing a settlement herein, and at Defendant’s request, this matter is accordingly continued to March 18, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 24.
The Court will address the issue of monetary sanctions, if necessary, at the next hearing.
b) Based on indications by Defendants that the parties are in the process of finalizing a settlement herein, and at Defendant’s request, this matter is accordingly continued to March 18, 2025, at 8:30 am in Department 24.
The Court will address the issue of monetary sanctions, if necessary, at the next hearing.
CV-23-003960 – RODRIGUEZ, JOSE vs CALHOUN, LORI LYNNE – Defendant Soto Transport, Inc’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Summary Adjudication – DENIED.
A common carrier's duty of due care to a passenger does not necessarily end when the passenger alights safely from the carrier's vehicle; it ends only when the passenger is discharged into a relatively safe space. A common carrier that ejects a passenger at a place other than the designated destination, and in doing so subjects the passenger to reasonably foreseeable injury, violates a common carrier's affirmative duty to prevent harm to its passengers. (Civ. Code § 2100;
Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co., (2001)93 Cal. App. 4th 1045). Defendant Soto’s Transport Inc. therefore had an affirmative duty to decedent Maria Castillo to drop her in a “relatively safe space.”
The Court finds that genuine triable issues of fact exist as to whether (1) Defendant breached said duty, and (2) whether any breach of said duty by Defendant was the cause of decedent’s death. (Defendant’s UMFS 1-9, Plaintiff’s Ex B, page. 52 at lines 1-6; Plaintiff’s UMFs Nos. 10-14, 15-28; Ingham v. Luxor Cab Co., (2001)93 Cal. App. 4th 1045).
Accordingly, Defendant Soto Transport Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment /Summary Adjudication is denied. (Code of Civ, Proc. § 437c)
CV-24-008481 – PHILLIPS, FRANKLIN J, JR vs GENERAL MOTORS LLC – a) Plaintiff’s Demurrer to Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint – SUSTAINED, with leave to amend; b) Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Portions of Defendant’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint – MOOT.
a) The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Counsel gave Defendant’s Counsel two days to respond to their meet and confer. This does not appear to the Court to amount to good faith meet and confer (Civ. Proc. Code § 430.41; In re Marriage of Moore, (2024)102 Cal.App.5th 1275).
The Court also notes that “Defendants in California routinely include the defense of failure to state a cause of action in their answers, whether they have brought a demurrer on that basis or not. Inclusion of the defense in the answer is harmless but unnecessary, as the defense is not waived by its omission”. “Where a complaint absolutely fails to state a cause of action, a demurrer is not necessary, but the defect may be raised at any stage of the proceeding and in any manner which presents grounds of objection.” (§ 9:3. Pleadings, 1 Cal. Affirmative Def. § 9:3 (2d ed.). Therefore, Defendant’s inclusion of the defense of “failure to state a cause of action” is in and of itself not fatal.
However, the Court finds that all the twenty -five (25) affirmative defenses pled in Defendant’s Answer do not “refer to the causes of action which they are intended to answer, in a manner by which they may be intelligibly distinguished”. (Civ. Proc. Code § 431.30 (g); Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 7(I)-A)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s demurrer to Defendant’s answer is sustained on grounds of uncertainty. (Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20)
The Court also finds that Defendants failed to plead said affirmative defenses with the factual detail required of complaints. (FPI Dev., Inc. v. Nakashima, (1991)231 Cal. App. 3d 367; Dep't of Fin. v. City of Merced, (2019) 33 Cal. App. 5th 286; Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758).
Defendant shall file its First Amended Answer with fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.
b) Given the Court’s ruling in Plaintiff’s companion demurrer, this motion is moot.
The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:
UD-24-001480 – CURTIS, RITA vs HERNANDEZ, ALEX – Motion to Set Aside Judgment – HEARING REQUIRED.