Civil Tentative Rulings

March 10, 2026

The following are the tentative ruling for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 21***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-25-004260 – SHOLES, CAMERON vs TURLOCK RV CENTER INC – Defendant Turlock RV Center Inc's Motion for Order Authorizing Deposit of Funds into Court, Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. 572 – DENIED.

For reasons stated in the opposition, Defendant’s proposal to deposit $6,000 with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 572 does not appear to be an appropriate provisional remedy under these circumstances.

Section 572 states, “When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a party to the action, that he or she has in his or her possession, or under his or her control, any money or other thing capable of delivery, which, being the subject of litigation, is held by him or her as trustee for another party, or which belongs or which is due to another party or which should, under the circumstances of the case be held by the court pending final disposition of the action, the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in court or delivered to such party, upon those conditions that may be just, subject to the further direction of the court.”

Here, Moving Defendant has not “admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the examination of a party” that Plaintiff is “undisputedly” due the proposed $6,000 deposit, or that “the funds are themselves the sole subject of the litigation.” Material factual disputes remain as to the scope of the parties’ contractual obligations, the representations made at the point of sale, and the amount of damages allegedly sustained. Under these circumstances, ordering a deposit would exceed the provisional purpose of § 572.

Moving Defendant itself states in its opening memorandum, “The Supreme Court … explains that an order to deposit requires a clear admission in the pleadings or a showing in the cause that the holder has no right to retain the funds and that the opposing party is entitled to them; moreover, the funds must be the subject of the litigation. [Citations.]” (Mem., at p. 3.) But here, as already noted above, there is no such admission or showing. Rather, Moving Defendant is proactively asserting responsibility for the amount that it contends is the owed GAP payment, even though it is not the named insurer. For this reason as well, the case is distinguishable from State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1127.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED.

CV-25-004345 – BAKER, TONY vs VARGAS, PEDRO RENDON – Plaintiff’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – GRANTED, and unopposed.

The unopposed motion of Attorney Thomas Reynolds of Valero Law Group to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff Tony Baker is GRANTED, effective on the filing of a proof showing service of the signed order on the client.

The clerk is directed to reject the current proposed order, and Moving Counsel is directed to submit a new proposed order within five court days with Item 3(b) checked.

PR-25-001212 – ESATE OF HEANEY, PATRICK - Petitioners Amanda Heaney and Tina Heaney's Motion for Order Prohibiting Sale or Transfer of Estate Property Pending Determination of Authority – DENIED.

The motion is procedurally defective and appears, in any case, to be unnecessary. If the real property is titled in the name of the decedent and there is no appointed personal representative of the decedent’s estate yet, no one has the power to sell the real property at issue. Even when appointment occurs, the Court must grant full authority under the Independent Administration of Estates Act for the personal representative to be able to sell real property without court approval.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Marie Silveria sitting on assignment in Department 23:

CV-24-004267 - VANN, SOCHENDA vs ALTMAN, ROBERT J, MD – Defendant’s Demurrer – OVERRULED.

The Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges fact supporting the medical battery claim at the pleading stage. In addition, the Court notes that certain of Defendant’s arguments appear to rely on extrinsic evidence, which cannot be considered on demurrer.

CV-25-000643 - TORRES, DANIEL MARTINEZ vs JOES TRAVEL PLAZA – a) Defendants' Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint - SUSTAINED, with leave to amend. b) Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Claim for Punitive Damages– DENIED, as MOOT.

a) The Court finds that the First Amended Complaint again fails to state sufficient facts to support the 2^nd, 3^rd, or 4^th causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).))

With regard to the Conversion and Trespass to Chattels claims, the pleading fails to allege facts supporting the element of intentional interference with property without Plaintiff’s consent, as the pleading against concedes that Plaintiff voluntarily sought and assented to Defendants’ services with regard to his vehicle. Additionally, as to Conversion, the facts alleged are internally inconsistent, as well as contradictory of facts alleged in the previous version of the pleading, and as a whole remain deficient as to the element of Defendants’ exercise of dominion over the property inconsistent with Plaintiff’s ownership or right of possession of the same.

With regard to the Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, the pleading is again internally inconsistent and fails to allege specific facts supporting the elements of Defendant’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s economic relationships and that the same would be disrupted by Defendants’ negligence.

Plaintiff shall submit his amended pleading within 20 days.

b) The motion to strike is MOOT, in view of the Court’s ruling on the demurrer, above.

CV-25-002878 - BAHADORI, BASIRAH vs CAL VALLEY JACK INC - Defendants Cal Valley Jack, Inc., Yadav Enterprises, Inc., and Ana Munoz's Motion to Compel Arbitration – GRANTED.

The Court takes judicial notice of the 3-28-25 order of the Alameda County Superior Court, wherein the arbitration agreement at issue herein was found to be governed by the FAA and not unconscionable. (Evid. Code § 452(d).) In light of this ruling, it appears that the only issue remaining for determination herein is whether the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”) (9 USC § 401 et seq.) applies to prevent compelled arbitration of this dispute.

In that regard, the Court finds that the instant action is not subject to the provisions of the EFAA.  While the Complaint contains a “harassment” claim based on a hostile work environment theory, the allegations reveal that the offensive behavior was focused on Plaintiff’s religious attire, which the law recognizes as the basis for a claim based on religious creed discrimination. (Gov’t. Code §§ 12940(l), 12926; 2 CCR §§11060, 11062; see, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2013).)

Therefore, the motion is GRANTED and the matter is compelled to arbitration pursuant to the FAA and the terms of subject agreement.

CV-25-002886 - HERNANDEZ, JOSE SANCHEZ vs AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO INC – a) Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production, Set One as to Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Hernandez and Request for Monetary Sanctions - DENIED, in part, as MOOT; GRANTED as to sanctions. b) Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One as to Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Hernandez and Request for Monetary Sanctions - DENIED, in part, as MOOT; GRANTED as to sanctions. c) Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.’s Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One as to Plaintiff Jose Sanchez Hernandez and Request for Monetary Sanctions - DENIED, in part, as MOOT; GRANTED as to sanctions.

a-c) The request for an order compelling responses is MOOT, in view of the service of verified responses on 2-25-26. However, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in connection with each of the instant motions, which appear to have been necessary in order to elicit the subject responses. Therefore, monetary sanctions of $320 are awarded against Plaintiff’s counsel in connection with each motion, payable to defense counsel.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24:

CV-18-003129 - OVRAHIM, NARMELIN vs UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY - Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively Summary Adjudication – GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.

The Court finds on a review of the evidence and testimony adduced that Plaintiffs’ claims that relate to Defendant’s train speed, horn use and crew training are preempted.  (Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., and § 20106). Furthermore, Defendant has demonstrated compliance with federal regulations as to the adequacy of Defendant’s horn use, as to Defendant’s speed prior to said accident and as to the crew’s training, certification and recertification. (49 C.F.R. §§ 222.21(a) and 222.23(a)(1); Carter v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1118; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit K, p. 21:19-20; Defendant’s Exhibit 3, Pollan Declaration at p.3; D’s Exhibit 7 Declaration of Betsey Gassaway). 

Plaintiff’s claims that relate to the adequacy of the crossing and its mechanisms are also pre-empted. (23 U.S.C.A. § 130; 49 U.S.C.A. § 20106; Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 2000, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 529 U.S. 344, 146 L.Ed.2d 374, on remand 15 Fed.Appx. 330, 2001 WL 873735.)

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendants violated their own internal rules regulations or policies created pursuant to a federal statute to avoid pre-emption. (Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2013).

A railroad is generally not liable for failure of its train to slow or stop simply because a pedestrian or a vehicle approaches a track ahead. (Carter v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Decedent did not constitute a specific individual risk until she stepped on the tracks in front of the train 3 seconds prior to impact at which point no action of Defendant would have stopped the impact of the train with decedent. (Pollan Declaration). Furthermore, prior to decedent stepping on the tracks, the crossing arm was engaged, lights were flashing, the train horn was sounding, and the movement of the train itself was creating a loud noise all of which should have been sufficient to alert decedent to the approaching train. (Pollan Declaration; Plaintiff’s Exhibit M, deposition of Alexis Davidson; Abboud v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2004 U.S. LEXIS 32245, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2004.)  

A triable issue of material fact exists as to the discrete issue of whether Defendant had a duty to install fencing at the location of the incident, as a pedestrian preventative measure in view of the high volume of pedestrian traffic at that crossing and given Defendant’s practice of installing fencing at such high pedestrian traffic locations. (Deposition of Jill Beaune P’s Ex G, P’s Exhibit H, Incident data, P’s Exhibit I, Deposition of Terry Morris p. 34, 37, 40-41, Exhibit J Deposition of Terry Morris; Deposition of Scott Kadous, P’s Exh O, pp. 23, 37, 66, and 77). 

Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the applicability of punitive damages. (Civ. Code §3294.) Particularly, as to corporate ratification. (Wilson v. S. California Edison Co., (2015) 234 Cal. App. 4th 123).

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted Defendant on all issues but the issue of the duty to install pedestrian fencing. (Aguilar v Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal 5^th 826; Code of Civil Procedure § 437c.)

Defendants Request for Judicial Notice is granted. (Evidence Code §§ 452 and 453).

Evidentiary objections to Defendant’s supporting evidence and exhibits are overruled.

Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s Police Report is sustained. (Vehicle Code section 20013)

Defendant’s objection to the admissibility of the declarations of Plaintiff’s experts Lee and Ogden are overruled except to the extent they recite inadmissible, non-admitted underlying documents or offer legal conclusions.

CV-22-004332 – ARNOLD, KIMBLY vs STEARNS LENDING SERVICES LLC – Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint – OVERRULED, in part, SUSTAINED, in part.

The Court finds as to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract, that Plaintiffs have pled the legal effect of the mortgage agreement by pleading its material terms, including Plaintiffs’ obligations thereunder. ((Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., (1990) 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371; Maxwell v. Dolezal, (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 93; Constr. Protective Servs., Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 4th 189, 199 (2002), as modified (Nov. 14, 2002).

As to Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Negligent Representation, Plaintiffs allege both negligent and willful conduct, both of which cannot be as to this cause of action.  Regarding a Negligent Misrepresentation Cause of Action, Plaintiffs have not pled facts supporting justifiable reliance. " (Tindell v. Murphy, (2018)) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239)

As to Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action for Fraud and Deceit, Plaintiffs fail to state factual allegations that support all the elements of a causes of action for fraud. Furthermore, conclusory allegations do not support a cause of action for fraud, and the particulars of who, what where and when must be provided, (Lazar v. Superior Ct., (1996)12 Cal. 4th 631).

To the extent that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for Recission does not refer to a specific contract whereas the Fourth Amended Complaint makes reference to various Agreements, this cause of action is uncertain, and Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to state the asserted cause of action. 

Plaintiffs’ Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Practices Act fails to state which provision of the Act is alleged to have been violated.  (People v. Alorica Inc., (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 60; Komarova v. National Credit Acceptance, Inc., (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324).

Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress fails to state facts alleging outrageous conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that tolerated in a civilized community. (Crouch v Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana (2019) 39 Cal.App.5^th 995).

As to Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for declaratory relief, declaratory relief is not a cause of action. Furthermore, the citation to Civ. Code section 2945.4 (b)(1) is to a non-existent provision of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint is hereby overruled as to Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action and sustained as to the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh causes of action with leave to amend. (Civ. Proc. Code section 430.41 (e)(1)).

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted, to the extent that the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the Exhibits submitted. (Evidence Code section 452).

CV-22-04659 – PONCE, CHRISTIAN vs CALIFORNIA DAIRIES INC – Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement – GRANTED.

Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court the Court finds as follows:

The Settlement class is certified for settlement purposes only in accordance with Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 3.769(c).

The proposed settlement is within the range of reasonableness and deemed to be presumptively valid, subject to any objections that may be heard at the final fairness hearing and subject to final approval by this Court. 

The class counsel, class representative and claims administrator are hereby preliminarily approved and appointed as set forth in the motion. The Court sets the following deadlines relative to this matter:

3-25-26              Defendant shall provide Class Information to Administrator.

4-14-26              Administrator shall mail Class Notice to Class Members.

7-1-26                Class Deadline for Submission of Opt-Out Notices, Objections or  Work

                           Week Disputes

7-8-26                Deadline for Class Administrator to Submit Declaration of Compliance 

                           and Due Diligence

7-15-26              Deadline for Class Counsel to file Motion for Final Approval and submit

                           due diligence declaration from Administrator.     

A final fairness hearing in this matter shall be set for Wednesday, August 12th, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24 of this Court.  The Class Notice shall be revised to reflect the date of the final fairness hearing and the corresponding deadlines.

CV-23-001227- CARSON HYBRID ENERGY STORAGE LLC vs TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT – a) Defendant’s Demurrer and Brief in Support thereof – SUSTAINED, in part, OVERRULED in part, with leave to amend. b) Defendant’s Motion to Strike and Brief in Support thereof - GRANTED with leave to amend.

a) When a pleading states that the plaintiff has complied with the claims statute, it has properly pleaded an ultimate fact under the claims presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act, and thus the statement of compliance is not a conclusion of law. (Esparza v. Kaweah Delta Dist. Hosp.), (2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 547. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are allowed to plead compliance with the claims presentation requirement in the Government Claims Act using a general allegation.  (Esparza v Kaweah, supra). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled compliance with the Government Claims Act. (Government Code section 945.4). The demurrer on this ground is therefore overruled.

As to the Second Cause of Action for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing this  rests on the same general set of facts, involves the same injury, and refers to the same instrumentality as alleged in Plaintiff’s original claim to D. (Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, as modified on denial of reh'g (June 28, 2019). Therefore, the demurrer to this cause of action is overruled.

Plaintiff’s Amendment to its First Amended Complaint to include a new cause of action for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage exceeds the scope of the Court’s order of September 17, 2025, sustaining the demurrer and giving Plaintiff the opportunity to correct any deficiencies in causes of action therein stated. same. (Community Water Coalition v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency Formation Com., (2011)200 Cal.App.4th 1317). A new cause of action may not be added to the Amended Complaint without the Court’s permission. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018.).  While the relation back doctrine may apply here, to the extent that the Third Cause of Action exceeds the scope of the Court’s said Order, the demurrer is sustained on this ground. (Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, as modified on denial of reh'g (June 28, 2019).

Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, this cause of action relies on new allegations arising from facts different from those related to the original complaint and therefore do not relate back thereto. Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to this cause of action are also deficient as to the elements of existing economic relationships with the probability of future economic benefit, Defendant’s prior knowledge of same and independently wrongful acts. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134; Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider, (2025); 115 Cal.App.5th 980; Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., (1995)11 Cal.4th 376). Additionally, this cause of action does not meet the Government Claims Act requirements. The demurrer is therefore sustained on this ground, with leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s objections and Defendant’s declarations are hereby sustained. Demurrers are limited to the pleadings and do not consider extrinsic evidence except on judicial notice.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. App.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal App. 4th 968, 994; Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881).

Regarding Plaintiff’s Objection to Portions of Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Demurrer, the Court will disregard Defendant’s arguments regarding the elements of the cause of action for Intentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage apart from the “independently wrongful element”. Additionally, Defendant’s arguments in its Reply regarding the claims presentation requirements as to Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of Action are elaborations of Defendant’s arguments as to Plaintiff’s lack of compliance with the claims presentation requirements as well as Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiff exceeding the scope of the leave to amend granted by the Court. Therefore, Plaintiff is denied leave to file a sur reply to Defendant’s Demurrer. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 142; Hernandez v. First Student, Inc., (2019) 37 Cal. App. 5th 270; Golden Door Props., LLC v. Cnty. of San Diego, (2020) 50 Cal. App. 5th 467; Jay v. Mahaffey, (2013)218 Cal. App. 4th 1522; Fowler v. Golden Pac. Bancorp, Inc., (2022) 80 Cal. App. 5th 205). 

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted as prayed. (Evidence Code section 452(c)

Plaintiffs shall file their Third Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of service of this order.

b) GRANTED with leave to amend.

The Court reiterates its previous findings in its order regarding Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint as to Plaintiff’s ability to recover damages for the causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint; that is, Plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred by sections 8.16 and 9.0 of the parties’ ISISA, and any claim for delay damages would not be recoverable in any case. 

Additionally, the waiver included in said section 8.16 of the parties’ agreement is effective and valid. (Winet v Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172).

In that regard, and pursuant to section 8.6 of the parties’ agreement, any arguments as to the existence of a contract of adhesion are unsupported, and legally untenable.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike is hereby granted as to the requested portions of the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend. (Civ. Proc. Code section 436). Based on the ruling in the related demurrer, any challenged portions of the Second Amended Complaint that relate to the Second Cause of Action or solely to the compliance requirement of the Government Claims Act regarding that cause of action are not stricken.

As to Plaintiff’s Objections to the Motion to Strike, no sur-reply shall be permitted as the challenged portions of Defendant’s Reply amount to rebuttals of Plaintiff’s arguments made in their opposition. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC, (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 142

CV-25-009095 – CROWNSHIELD, EILA DIANE vs GALVAN, DANIEL – Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue Hearing – MOOT, given the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s related Motion to File a First Amended Verified Complaint, and on Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint

CV-25-003425 – WINCHESTER, KIMBERLY ANN vs URENO, STELLA M – Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (CCP 473(b), 473.5) - GRANTED.

The Court finds that Defendant’s Motion is timely and provides grounds for the grant of the requested relief on the basis of a finding of mistake on Defendant’s part, that Defendant acted promptly to seek relief and that said relief does not prejudice Plaintiff. (Civ. Proc. Code section 473 (b); Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc., (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 13; (County of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.)

Defendant’s Proposed Answer is attached to the motion as required by statute (Civ. Proc. Code section 473 (b); Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi, (2009) 175 Cal. App. 4th 393, as modified (June 26, 2009).

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is hereby granted.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

***There are no Tentative Rulings for Department 19***